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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent booming development of renewable power generation and government 
subsidies are constantly under scrutiny and various opinions exist regarding whether subsidies 
should be continued or not. Motivated by the controversies and debates, this dissertation 
attempted to address the investment decision making problem under uncertainties in the 
renewable power industry from the perspective of an individual power producer.   
Given that independent power producers still dominate the renewable power 
production and that majority of their output are sold through long-term power purchase 
agreements, this study focused on two types of uncertainties that could represent most of their 
kinds: the operations & maintenance (O&M) cost and governmental subsidy’s 
renewal/expiration. Three types of investment activities that covers the major part of any 
renewable power plant’s economic life are thoroughly investigated in a chronological order: 
an initial entry, exit when the plant reaches its economic life, and repowering.  
A real-options approach was adopted and improved to model the value of a power plant 
considering its future activities, while both cost and policy changes modeled as some stochastic 
processes. Significant policy implications and managerial insights were obtained as a result of 
extensive analytical modeling and statistical study of empirical evidence. 
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CHAPTER 1 . INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, there have been tremendous increases in renewable power production 
across the U.S. For instance, the total capacity of the wind power alone was 24,651 MW in 
2008, and it increased to 34,296 MW in 2009 (EIA, 2010a). At the same time, the production 
technologies for the renewable energy have improved substantially. The main drivers for this 
phenomenal growth have not only been the economic efficiency and technology breakthroughs 
in renewable power production, but also been the favorable government support due to 
environmental concerns as well as higher oil and natural gas prices (Wiser et al., 2007). 
From the perspective of a single renewable power producer, however, the economic 
uncertainties are massive and consequential. Though long-term contracted sales to utilities 
remains the most common off-take arrangement, increasing sales to power marketers leads to 
more producers taking on some merchant risks and having a portion of their revenues tied to 
the spot market prices, which, are highly volatile (Wiser and Bolinger, 2008). The installation 
cost, and capital cost of a new renewable power project are also subject to many changing 
market factors, such as material and energy input prices. 
Another significant economic variable is the operations and maintenance (O&M) cost, 
which, usually includes the costs of wages and materials associated with operating and 
maintaining the plant, as well as rent (i.e., land lease payments). Other ongoing expenses, 
including taxes, property insurance, and workers’ compensation insurance, are generally not 
included (Wiser and Bolinger, 2008). Although market data on actual project-level O&M costs 
for renewable power plants are scarce, evidences have shown that they are increasing on 
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average with respect to operating time with substantial volatility (Fraunhofer IWES, 2006). 
Many factors can contribute to the uncertain spike in the O&M cost, such as unpredicted 
turbine break-down and natural disaster. In this dissertation we focus only on the O&M cost 
among all possible economic variables as it applies to all renewable power plants regardless 
ownership and financing programs.  
On the other hand, governmental subsidies have also played a key role in promoting 
power generation from renewable sources, and are often subject to frequent expiration/renewal 
cycles due to legislative and political reasons. One of the most illustrative examples comes 
from the controversial federal Production Tax Credit (PTC), which provides per-kilowatt-hour 
tax credit for electricity generated by qualified energy resources. Since first enacted in 1992, 
the PTC has been renewed or extended on several occasions. Currently the PTC has been 
expired since the first day of 2014, and the most recent renewal occurred at the beginning of 
2013, which was made to extend to the end of 2013 (Silverstein, 2013). In this dissertation we 
specifically study the PTC to represent various existing policy schemes. 
Under these uncertainties, it is highly desirable to model and analyze the economically 
rational behaviors of renewable power producers so that the government can develop 
appropriate economic policies and the industry can plan their business strategies accordingly.  
Hence, the overall objective of this dissertation is to understand how economically 
rational renewable power producers make decisions under significant and pervasive 
uncertainties and derive useful policy implications. In particular, we consider the following 
critical problems, and each of these problems will be solved as a part of the dissertation. 
1) The optimal entry and exit decision making under stochastic O&M cost.  
2) The optimal repowering decision making under stochastic O&M cost. 
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3) The optimal repowering decision making under policy uncertainties.  
4) Empirical evidences and quantitative study of O&M cost evolution and policy 
changes. 
1.1 Optimal Entry and Exit Decision Making 
One major recurring question about the massive development of renewable power 
plants is regarding the retirement of these plants. In 1990’s there were numerous cases of 
abandonment of renewable power plants that had been in operation since 1970’s and 1980’s 
where the plant owners simply walked away (WebEcoist.com, 2011) as the economic and non-
economic conditions deteriorated.  For example, there are thousands of abandoned turbines 
still littering the landscape in the areas of Altamont Pass, Tehachapi, and San Gorgonio in 
California alone (Wilkinson, 2010). The situation for solar farms is quite similar, and certainly 
no better (The Center for Land Use Interpretation, 2011).  
At this point in time, the “rebirth” of renewable power plants is of an order of 
magnitude larger than the previous manifestation in 1970’s and 1980’s, and a priori there is no 
basis that one can assume the abandonment in a truly massive scale will not happen in the near 
future. In fact, currently, in numerous regions, if a plant owner walks away (i.e., abandons the 
renewable power plant), there is no or few consequences or penalties (WebEcoist.com, 2011). 
Specifically, we observe that, as the operation and maintenance (O&M) cost increases with 
respect to time (Wiser and Bolinger, 2008), there is a substantial incentive to walk away even 
when there remains some “physical” life in the plant (see e.g., Myers and Majd, 1983). 
Furthermore, we note that the O&M cost is increasing on average with respect to time, but the 
exact amount at a given time is typically stochastic not only because numerous repairs are 
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unpredictable but also because the current physical age is often quite young relative to the 
physical life estimated by the plant builders (see e.g., Martinze et al., 2009). 
More recently, we do note that, in a few places, there has been some consideration or 
implementation of a simple and straightforward exit fee as an insurance to enable the proper 
disposal of the renewable plants in case of abandonment (New Hampshire Office of Energy 
and Planning, 2008). This observation has provided us with a major motivation for studying 
the relationship between exit decision making and policy intervention.  
Under these circumstances, it is highly desirable to understand the economically 
rational decisions on exits and entries of renewable power plants, which include timely policy 
implications especially in the areas of government’s incentives and fees. 
1.2 Optimal Repowering Decision Making  
Developments in renewable industries have also raised another important issue 
regarding the upgrading and replacement opportunities of the aging renewable power plants. 
As stated before in Section 1.1, these plants, by today’s standard, are absolutely inefficient as 
the operations and maintenance (O&M) cost increases, obsolete to the point of almost 
ineffective, and occupying perhaps the best locations and largest areas for renewable power 
production.   
For example, for wind power, Wagman (2008) reports that the old turbines operating 
since 1980’s in California are very inefficient and underpowered, and wind resource could be 
much better exploited by replacing them with new turbines with a much larger capacity, 
building them higher off the ground, and spacing them apart. In wind power industry, this 
series of actions, including the partial decommissioning of the aging plants (i.e., some 
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infrastructure and landscape need not be fully restored as in rigorous full decommissioning) 
and the installation of new wind towers, is called “repowering” and in my research I extended 
this term to other renewable power plants.  
This problem is by no means unique to the wind power industry. Many aging power 
plants from other renewable resources such as solar and biomass also exhibit similar problems. 
For example, the Arco solar power plant in San Luis Obispo, California, was originally 
constructed in 1983, and used to be the largest photovoltaic array in the world. It was 
dismantled in the late 1990’s and has not been repowered yet (WebEcoist.com, 2011), 
implying perhaps one of the best and largest power plants for solar power production has not 
been utilized for more than a decade. Therefore, it becomes very important for us to learn how 
renewable power producers make repowering decisions regarding their aging plants, and how 
to design a better policy scheme to encourage repowering.  
In other countries with large numbers of aging renewable plants, various government 
incentives have been utilized to encourage repowering. For example, Demark has been offering 
production based feed-in tariffs for certified wind repowering projects since 2001, and it now 
has more than 2/3 of its oldest turbines repowered (Wiser, 2007). Also, Germany has been 
offering similar feed-in tariffs for repowering projects since the Amendment of the Renewable 
Technology Law in 2004 (WWEA, 2006). 
In the U.S., however, we observe that repowering activities have been very slow until 
now. For example, in California, wind repowering projects have been conducted since the 
enactment of the state’s renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in 2002. By the end of 2007, 
approximately 365 MW’s of wind capacity have been repowered, which merely accounts for 
about 20% of all capacity installed before 1994 (KEMA, Inc., 2008).  
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A key difference between the slow pace of repowering in the U.S. and the fast pace of 
repowering in certain Western European countries is the government incentive policies as the 
physical characteristics and the technological capabilities are similar. For example, in 
California, numerous existing old turbines are operating as Qualifying Facilities (QF’s), which 
are profitable given very generous contracted selling prices while excluded from the federal 
Production Tax Credit (PTC) if repowered (Wiser, 2007). For these renewable power 
producers of the aging plants, the economically rational decision may be to keep old turbines 
running until they no longer function, and perhaps abandon them at that time point. Hence, it 
is not surprising to actually see thousands of such aging turbines abandoned across the U.S. 
(Wilkinson, 2010). 
1.3 Repowering Under Policy Uncertainties  
In studying the first two problems, we focus merely on the stochastic O&M cost which 
represents the internal uncertainties that grows endogenously within the power plant. However, 
from a broader perspective of the whole industry there exist many industry-level uncertainties 
that will not only affect one individual plant. Instead, every single player in the industry makes 
their investment decisions under the influence of these external uncertainties.  
As one of the biggest drivers of the growth of wind capacity in U.S, the PTC helps to 
reduce the price of wind-generated electricity, which even makes wind power now 
economically attractive in some regions. Its impact on wind generation expansion can also be 
partially observed by the fluctuation of annual installed capacity of wind since the PTC was 
first enacted in 1992. Specifically, the PTC expired in 2000, 2002 and 2004, each time resulting 
in decreases of at least 50% in new installed capacity (DOE, 2006). This historical experience 
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indicates that the frequent expiration/extension cycle of PTC might have negative 
consequences for the growth of wind power.  This boom-and-bust cycle might has made the 
PTC less effective in stimulating low-cost wind development for the reason that potential 
investors self-select to avoid investment in wind power due to the uncertainty in PTC.  
Motivated by the existence of policy uncertainties as well as their effects on renewable 
power investment, we will formulate and solve a repowering decision making problem under 
both O&M cost and external policy uncertainties.  
1.4 Structure of Dissertation  
This dissertation consists of four main chapters, in which each chapter addresses one 
of the three problems stated in previous Section 1.1 through 1.3 as well as the empirical study.  
Chapter 2 models and analyzes how an economically rational decision maker will enter and 
exit a renewable power market when the O&M cost is represented by a geometric Brownian 
motion (GBM) process. Based on our findings, we also conduct extensive sensitivity analyses 
with respect to various critical parameters with major policy implications.  
Chapter 3 expands the scope of our original problem in Chapter 2 into the repowering 
area. Following the assumption of GBM based O&M cost, we investigate the repowering 
decision making problem for three specific types of renewable power producers. Specifically, 
the decision making process of each type is formulated as a multi-stage optimal stopping 
problem, which is solved with analytical solutions in terms of O&M cost thresholds.  
In Chapter 4, we will focus on the combined effect of stochastic O&M cost and 
exogenous policy uncertainties. We start with a specific policy renewal model where we 
assume the policy is currently not in effect but will be renewed. This is followed by an 
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expiration model where the policy is currently in effect but will expire in the future. We then 
proceed to present a generalized model where the random policy switches between two regimes 
(i.e., in effect or not). For each of the three models the optimal repowering strategy will be 
obtained in terms of two threshold values. 
In Chapter 5 we will empirically validate two most important and distinct modeling 
assumptions that I use in this dissertation across the three chapters: the GBM-based O&M cost 
assumption and the Poisson process-based policy cycle.   
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CHAPTER 2 . AN EXIT AND ENTRY STUDY OF RENEWABLE 
POWER PRODUCERS: A REAL OPTIONS APPROACH 
 
In this chapter we aim to 1) formulate and analyze mathematical models of exit and 
entry decisions of a single renewable power plant from a real options perspective with the 
assumption that the O&M cost follows a GBM process, 2) show the managerial insights from 
sensitivity analyses surrounding the exit and entry decisions that are made by renewable power 
plant decision makers, and 3) derive policy implications that are theoretically interesting and 
practically timely. From this study, we hope to provide specific insights for relevant decisions 
and policies, and stimulate the critical discussion among renewable power plant decision 
makers, government regulators, legislative policy makers, as well as academics.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We first present a review on relevant 
literature in Section 2.1.  In Section 2.2 we model the exit decision of a currently operating 
renewable power plant under the assumption of a GBM based O&M cost. This model leads to 
the derivation of the threshold O&M cost, above which the renewable power plant exits the 
market, as well as to the derivation of the expected remaining life of the renewable power plant. 
In Section 2.3, we conduct sensitivity analysis of the exit threshold O&M cost and the expected 
remaining life with respect to various critical parameters such as the exit fee. We then consider 
the entry decision of a new renewable power plant in Section 2.4, and derive the threshold 
O&M cost, below which such an investment will be made, as well as the expected life of the 
renewable power plant. This is also followed by the sensitivity analysis of the entry threshold 
O&M cost and the expected life in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents some of the key features 
of our model through an illustrative numerical example based on a wind farm, and in Section 
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2.7 we discuss the policy implications and the various assumptions defining the scope of our 
study. Concluding remarks and comment on future research are provided in Section 2.8. 
2.1 Literature Review 
For this study, there are several groups of relevant literature. First, in the area of 
financial and economic applications in the electric power industry, Wang and Min (2006) 
applies a real options approach to a case of inter-related generation projects. Also, in Wang 
and Min (2008), a financial portfolio consisting of electric power commodities was managed 
while, in Wang and Min (2010), financial hedging techniques were developed for electric 
power producers.  
In the context of nuclear power plants, Takashima et al. (2007) investigates 
decommissioning by applying a real options approach. That paper differs from our approach 
as the primary driver of the exit was claimed to be the stochastic electricity price, and not the 
cost components, which were assumed to be deterministic. We caution that there are other 
reasons for an exit such as competitive or regulatory concerns, which are beyond the scope of 
this paper. As for solar power, Lorenz et al. (2008) advocates phasing economic incentives out, 
but only prudently and gradually. 
For wind power management, Fleten and Maribu (2004) addresses the investment 
timing and capacity choice of wind power under uncertainty under a fixed quantity contract. 
Also, Fleten et al. (2007) examines the investment strategies when renewable power is 
generated in a decentralized manner. These papers are different from our approach because 
they would not be able to explain the exit behavior that can be theoretically predicted or 
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empirically observed. Also, the stochastic components in these papers are not the O&M cost 
(e.g., electricity price).  
As for the stochastic O&M costs, Khoub Bakht et al. (2008) investigates statistical 
repair and maintenance cost models for tractors while Leung and Lai (2003) statistically 
studied the quality and reliability aspects of bus engines. Almansour and Insley (2011), on the 
other hand, applies the stochastic cost model for the oil sands in Canada. In addition, in Costa 
Lima and Suslick (2006), both the price and operating costs are modeled as GBM processes 
for mining projects.  
Meanwhile, in the area of equipment replacement, there are numerous examples of 
more conventional (i.e., non-real options approaches) papers (see e.g., Hartman and Murphy, 
2006). In Ye (1990), the replacement strategy is derived under the assumption of a GBM O&M 
cost while in Zambujal-Oliveira and Duque (2011) considers both O&M cost and salvage value 
as GBM processes.  
2.2 Modeling and Analysis of Exit Decision 
In this section, let us consider a firm consisting of a single renewable power plant that 
is currently in operation. For the decision maker, we assume that there exists an option to 
abandon the renewable power plant, and to exit the electricity market. Furthermore, we make 
the following critical assumptions that enable us to model and analyze the exit decision that is 
economically rational as well as tractable. We note that the relaxation of the assumptions that 
would enhance the realism of the models in this paper will be addressed in Section 2.7 later. 
Assumption 1: There already exists a power purchase contract between the renewable 
power plant and a utility company with the appropriate transmission connection at a fixed 
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selling price of P  ($/MWh) at any time point (see Roques et al., 2008). We assume that the 
upper bound of the renewable power purchase quantity of the contract will not be reached at 
this power plant.  
Assumption 2: In making the exit decision, the decision maker will rely on the fixed 
(expected) production quantity per unit time, which is equal to the quantity demanded by the 
utility (e.g., via a contract). By this assumption, we are not implying the actual production and 
demand quantities remain constant over time, but, for planning purposes of the producer, we 
are simplifying the dynamic aspects of renewable energy source such as wind speed or daylight 
availability, etc. (see e.g., Fleten and Maribu, 2004). Specifically, we utilize the fixed annual 
production quantity, K
 
(MWh/year). We further assume that, this production quantity is equal 
to the nameplate capacity times the capacity factor, which is a standard procedure for the 
generation planning in the electric power industry, alternative procedures notwithstanding (see 
e.g., Wiser and Bolinger, 2007) 
Assumption 3: The O&M cost ($/MWh) at any time point, C , follows the geometric 
Brownian motion (GBM) process. Specifically, 
C CdC Cdt Cdzα σ= +
                                                                                                 
(2.1) 
where Cα  is the instantaneous growth rate of the O&M cost (% per year), Cσ  is the 
instantaneous volatility of C
 
(% per square root of year), and dz  is the increment of a standard 
Wiener process z  ( tdz dtε=  where ~ (0,1)t Nε ).  
Typically, the O&M cost includes costs associated with repairs, spare parts, 
maintenance, and consumables necessary for O&M (see e.g., EWEA, 2004). Also, we note 
that modeling the O&M cost as a GBM process is not new as we explained in the introduction.  
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Assumption 4: There exists a fixed exit fee of W
 
( 0W ≥ ) when the option to abandon 
is exercised, and the decision maker is aware of this a priori. Currently in the U.S., few local, 
state, and federal rules and regulations exist that require the removal and disposal of renewable 
power plants when the option to abandon is exercised, and some authors claim that the 
renewable power plant decision makers have strong incentive to abandon their renewable 
power plants even if it is physically viable to operate (Wilkinson, 2010). Our model will allow 
this current situation as a special case of 0W = . 
Assumption 5: The remaining cost components are irrelevant to the decision maker 
regarding the option to abandon. i.e., the cost components such as non-specific overheads, 
taxes, etc. are negligible for our planning purposes. We also assume that, there is no salvage 
value at the time point of exit, and our model does not explicitly factor in specific government 
programs such as the production tax credit (see e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, 2011). 
Assumption 6: More sophisticated options such as a partial shut-down, mothballing, 
etc. are not available for the renewable power plant. These options are beyond the scope of this 
paper, and will not be considered. 
Under these assumptions, our problem can be interpreted as an optimal stopping 
problem. We observe that, the higher the O&M cost, the stronger the incentive to abandon. 
Therefore, intuitively, the range of the O&M cost where the optimal decision is to abandon 
may be characterized by a single scalar threshold of *C . That is, if C is between *[ , )C ∞ , then 
the optimal decision is to abandon. And, otherwise, the optimal decision is to continue 
operation. It can be shown (see e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) that indeed there will be only 
one threshold *C  for this problem.  
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As long as it is not optimal to abandon the renewable power plant (i.e., C  is in the 
continuation region), the value of the renewable power plant project, ( )V C , must satisfy the 
following differential equation, which results from Bellman’s principle of optimality (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994): 
( ) [ ]EVdt P C Kdt dVρ = − +                                                                                      (2.2) 
where ρ  is the annual discount rate (% per year), which is often called the expected rate of 
return (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The left-hand side of (2.2) is the total return on the value of 
the renewable power plant. The first term of the right-hand side is the immediate profit flow 
from keeping the renewable power plant operating while the last term is the expected capital 
appreciation of the renewable power plant value function. 
By Ito’s Lemma, dV  could be expanded as 
( )
2
2 2
2
1
2C C C
V V VdV Cdt Cdz C dt
t C C
α σ σ
∂ ∂ ∂
= + + +
∂ ∂ ∂
 
We notice that we are considering an indefinite horizon problem here so ( )V C
 
is time 
invariant. Hence, 0V
t
∂
=
∂
 and the above equation becomes 
( )
2
2 2
2
1
2C C C
V VdV Cdt Cdz C dt
C C
α σ σ
∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂
                                                             
(2.3)
                                     
Substituting (2.3) into (2.2), and after rearranging and simplifying terms, we have  
2
2 2
2
1 ( ) 0
2 C C
V VC C V P C K
C C
σ α ρ∂ ∂+ − + − =
∂ ∂
                                                            
(2.4) 
We note that (2.4) is a differential equation. To guarantee its convergence, we impose 
that Cα ρ<  (see e.g., Costa Lima and Suslick, 2006). We also note that the following 
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boundary conditions between the operation and abandonment states are needed to obtain the 
optimal threshold *C . 
*( )V C W= −
                                                                                                              
(2.5)
 
*
'( ) 0V C =                                                                                                                  (2.6)                                                              
The first one is the value-matching condition and the second one is the smooth-pasting 
condition. The value-matching condition (2.5) requires that at the exit threshold, the value of 
the renewable power plant project equals the value of exit. The smooth-pasting condition (2.6) 
assures that *C  is the optimal exercise point by defining the continuance and smoothness of 
( )V C  at *C . 
By solving (2.4) with (2.5) and (2.6), we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.1   Given 0 Cα ρ< < , the value of an operating renewable power plant 
is 
( )11( ) CV C A C CK PKβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                                      
(2.7) 
where ( )22 2 2 21 1 2 1 2 2C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − + 
                            
(2.8) 
( )( )
( )
1*
1 1
CPK WC
K
ρ ρ α β
β
+ −
=
−
                                                                                   
(2.9)
                               
( ) ( ) 11 1*1C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                                                        
(2.10) 
The proof is given in Appendix A.1.1. The economically rational decision is as follows. 
As soon as the O&M cost is equal to or greater than *C , the power producer will pay the exit 
fee and abandon the renewable power plant with the corresponding renewable power plant 
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project value of –W. Otherwise, the producer continues to operate the renewable power plant 
with the corresponding value of ( )V C .  
We also note that the value function ( )V C
 
given by (2.7) has the following 
interpretation. Before the decision maker chooses to abandon (i.e., the decision maker is still 
holding the option to abandon), the value of the renewable power plant consists of two parts: 
the value of the operating renewable power plant and the value of the option to abandon the 
renewable power plant. Hence, in (2.7), the first one term is the value of the option to abandon, 
while the last two terms represent the expected cost and revenue streams when the initial price 
and cost are observed as P  and C .  
Thus far, we have derived the value function of the renewable power plant project, and 
the threshold value of *C  in terms of aforementioned critical parameters. We now proceed to 
derive the expected remaining life of the renewable power plant under the technical assumption 
of 21 2C Cα σ> , as shown in the relevant literature (see e.g., Mauer and Ott, 1995). Let 
( ) lnF C C= . Then, ( )dF C  can be expanded by Ito’s Lemma as 
( )2( ) 1 2C C CdF C dt dzα σ σ= − +  and therefore for any finite time period T , the change in 
( )F C  is distributed with mean ( )21 2C C Tα σ−  and variance 2CTσ . Hence the expected first 
passage time of *C , measured from
c
C , the current level of the O&M cost, can be calculated 
as ( ) ( )* 2ln ln 1 2c C CC C α σ− − .
 
Hence, the expected remaining operating life is given by,  
( ) ( )* * 2ln ln 1 2EX c C CT C C α σ= − −
                                                                         
(2.11)
 
where *C  is the exit threshold as in (2.9). 
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2.3 Sensitivity Analysis of the Exit Decision on αC, σC, and W 
Given the expression for *C shown in (2.9), the sensitivity analysis can be performed 
in a straightforward manner with respect to the key parameters of Cα , Cσ , and W , and the 
results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.2   Given 0 Cα ρ< < , 
*
0
C
C
σ
∂
>
∂ , 
*
0
C
C
α
∂
<
∂ , 
*
0C
W
∂
>
∂ , 
*
0C
P
∂
>
∂ , and 
*
0C
K
∂
<
∂ . 
The outline of the proof is given in Appendix A.1.2, and the economic interpretation 
of the results is as follows. * 0CC σ∂ ∂ >  indicates that an increase in the volatility leads to the 
increase in the threshold value. This is because with increased volatility, there is a greater 
chance of a deeper reduction in the O&M cost in the near future, and it is beneficial to wait a 
little longer (hence, *C
 
becomes higher). As for * 0CC α∂ ∂ < , we note that as the O&M cost 
growth rate increases, it is beneficial to exit earlier (hence, *C
 
becomes lower). * 0C W∂ ∂ >  
indicates that an increase in the exit fee leads to an increase in the threshold value. This is so 
because, with a higher level of the exit fee, the decision maker has an incentive to wait a little 
longer for a possible reduction in the O&M cost in the near future (hence, *C becomes higher). 
Now, as for * 0C P∂ ∂ > , if the contract power price is increasing, we note that the revenue and 
the value of the renewable site project should increase, and the decision maker has an incentive 
to continue to operate a little longer (hence, *C
 
becomes higher). Finally, * 0C K∂ ∂ <  
indicates that as the production quantity increases, the threshold value decreases. This is so 
because the total O&M cost increases even more as it is proportional to the production quantity. 
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Therefore, it is more beneficial to exit earlier (hence, *C
 
becomes lower). We note that, due to 
our Assumption 2 (this production quantity is equal to the nameplate capacity times the 
capacity factor), this sensitivity analysis can be applied to the capacity in place of production 
quantity interchangeably. 
If we assume that preventing a premature exit (relative to the physical life) is 
environmentally desirable (so that we can delay exploiting new resources), increases in W
 
is 
desirable. Hence, any government policy to increase the exit fee is desirable. For example, if a 
community is recruiting a single renewable power plant, the smaller capacity is more desirable 
than the larger capacity assuming that preventing a premature exit is the primary criterion. We 
caution that this interpretation is strictly focusing on the exit decision of the existing renewable 
power plants under the aforementioned criterion, and will be revisited numerous times in the 
succeeding sections of this paper.  
Finally, we note that the sign of *C ρ∂ ∂  is ambiguous as some components of *C  
increase while others decrease in a way that the total effect is unwieldy to interpret. We also 
note that, with the expected remaining operating life of (2.11), we have * 0EX cT C∂ ∂ < , 
* 0EX CT α∂ ∂ < , * 0EX CT σ∂ ∂ > , * 0EXT W∂ ∂ > , * 0EXT P∂ ∂ > , and * 0EXT K∂ ∂ < . The 
interpretation of these results is analogous to the case with respect to *C .  
2.4 Modeling and Analysis of the Entry Decision 
In this section, we extend the previous model by considering the entry decision for the 
renewable power plant. For this extension, we assume that the aforementioned power purchase 
contract is available for a new renewable power plant. Two additional assumptions are made 
as follows. 
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Assumption 7: The construction period of the renewable power plant is assumed to be 
negligible in our model. This simplifying assumption is made so as to focus on the entry 
decision without diluting our attention on how best to make economic decisions during the 
construction period. This type of simplifying assumption can be found in numerous papers (see 
e.g., Fleten and Maribu, 2004). 
Assumption 8: Once the construction occurs, then there is a lump sum investment cost 
of I
 
($), which includes the cost of materials, labor, land, etc. This cost is treated as an 
irreversible sunk cost, which cannot be recovered later. 
 We note that the firm makes an entry decision by evaluating the direct net revenue (i.e., 
revenue minus cost) from the renewable power plant plus the value of the option to exit. We 
recall that the option value critically depends on the O&M cost, and we will denote 0C
 
as the 
initial O&M cost at time point at which the renewable power plant starts to operate. We further 
note that there is no O&M cost prior to the start of the renewable power plant.  
We also note that, under the additional assumption of the contract power price 
following a GBM process, the option value for waiting to enter can be incorporated. In our 
model construction, however, such an option is excluded by design because 1) there are 
numerous fixed price contracts already in practice (see aforementioned Fleten and Maribu, 
2004, in the Introduction section) and 2) parallel GBM processes of the price and cost typically 
make analytical studies infeasible and often make numerical results difficult to sort out (see 
more in the Section 2.7).  
Under our model framework, if the value of the potential renewable power plant project 
is greater than or equal to the irreversible investment I , the firm will enter the market. 
Therefore, the condition under which he decides to enter becomes: 
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( )10 1 0 0( ) CV C A C C K PK Iβ ρ α ρ= − − + ≥
                                                           
(2.12) 
For the boundary “marginal” firm without a strictly positive net benefit, we define 
another type of the O&M cost threshold, 0C . Namely,  
( )11 0 0 0CA C C K PK Iβ ρ α ρ− − + − =
                                                                   
(2.13) 
This
 
0C  of (2.13) can be viewed as the upper bound of the initial O&M cost at which 
the firm will decide to enter the market.  
More formally, even though there is no explicit closed-form solution for 0C  in (2.13), 
we have the following proposition that proves the existence and uniqueness of 0C  under two 
fairly undemanding conditions. 
Proposition 2.3   Let us assume that *0C C<
 
and 0PK Iρ − > , then there exists a 
unique solution for 0C
 
in ( )11 0 0 0CA C C K PK Iβ ρ α ρ− − + − = . 
The proof is given in Appendix A.1.3. The condition *0C C<
 
is not stringent as, if 
*
0C C≥ , a power producer will enter and exit the market instantaneously, which leads to no 
practical use nor sense (not unlike assuming Cα ρ≥ ). The condition 0PK Iρ − >
 
indicates 
that the cumulative revenue (
0
sPKe ds PKρ ρ∞ − =∫ ) is greater than the initial investment I . It 
is a reasonable assumption that any firm considering the entry has a tangible revenue stream 
that will at least cover the initial investment. 
From Proposition 2.3 and the monotonicity of 0( )V C  shown in the proof, we claim that 
any firm with 0C 0C≤
 
will enter the market while any other one with 0C 0C≥
 
will not. 
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Finally, we note that, as in the case of the exit decision, we derive the expected 
economic life of a new renewable power plant to be 
 
( ) ( )* * 20ln ln 1 2C CT C C α σ= − −
                                                                              
(2.14) 
and that of a marginal renewable power plant with 0 0C C=  to be 
( ) ( )* 20ln ln 1 2C CT C C α σ= − −
                                                                            
(2.15) 
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis of the Entry Decision on αC, σC, and W 
Given the implicit function for 0C
 
in (2.13), sensitivity analysis can be performed with 
respect to the key parameters and the results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.4   Given 0 Cα ρ< < , 0 0
C
C
σ
∂
>
∂ , 
0 0
C
C
α
∂
<
∂ , 
0 0C
W
∂
<
∂ , 
0 0C
P
∂
>
∂ , and 
0 0C
I
∂
<
∂ . 
The outline of the proof is given in Appendix A.1.4. The interpretation for 
0 0CC α∂ ∂ < , 0 0CC σ∂ ∂ > , and 0 0C P∂ ∂ >  is straightforward. i.e., as the volatility and the 
contract power price increase, the entry threshold O&M cost increases. i.e., more (marginal) 
firms will enter the market. On the other hand, as the growth rate in the O&M cost increases, 
less (marginal) firms will enter the market.  
As for 0 0C W∂ ∂ < , an increase in the exit fee will lead to a decrease in the threshold 
O&M cost. This implies that less firms will enter, resulting in a lower power production 
quantity from renewable energy. At the same time, this will lead to a lower number of marginal 
firms, reducing the number of premature exits (relative to the physical life). Therefore, the 
22 
 
economic and environmental consequences of a government policy for a higher exit fee on the 
entry (not exit) of renewable power plants are far from simple and straightforward. 
As for 0 0C I∂ ∂ < , the increase in the initial investment will decrease the threshold 
O&M cost. This implies that any initial subsidy provided by the government will lead to more 
(marginal) firms entering the market resulting in a higher power production quantity from the 
renewable energy. On the other hand, this will lead to a higher number of marginal firms, 
increasing the number of premature exit (relative to the physical life). Once again, the 
consequence of a government policy for a higher level of initial subsidy on the entry (not exit) 
is complex. 
In addition, we note that the signs of 0C ρ∂ ∂
 
and 0C K∂ ∂
 
are ambiguous with the 
reason that is similar to the one for the case of ρ  in the exit sensitivity analysis. 
Let us now turn our attention to the expected life of a new renewable power plant, *T . 
As in the case of the exit decision, we can obtain * 0 0T C∂ ∂ < , * 0CT α∂ ∂ < , * 0CT σ∂ ∂ > , 
* 0T W∂ ∂ > , * 0T P∂ ∂ > , and * 0T K∂ ∂ <  with straightforward and intuitive interpretation. 
As for the expected life of a new renewable power plant from a marginal producer, T , 
generally, the signs from the sensitivity analysis are ambiguous and the corresponding 
interpretation unwieldy. The only two exceptions are 0T W∂ ∂ >  and 0T I∂ ∂ > , i.e., ., as 
the exit fee or the initial investment increases, the corresponding expected life increases. This 
is so because, as the exit fee or the initial investment increases, the threshold O&M cost to 
enter will decrease, which result in longer expected life. 
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2.6 Numerical Analysis: The Case of a Wind Farm 
In this section, we numerically illustrate some of the key features of our models. 
2.6.1. Parameter Values 
Let us first present the parameter values used in this section. Even though these values 
are hypothetical, to be realistic numbers, we have consulted U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s Updated Capital Costs Estimates for Electricity Generation Plants (EIA, 
2010b) as well as others (e.g., Kjarland, 2007; Takashima et al., 2007). They are summarized 
in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Parameters and corresponding values 
Contract power price P 48 $/MWh 
Nameplate capacity/Capacity factor 3 MW/33.33% 
Production quantity K 8,760 MWh/yr 
Investment cost I $1,000,000  
Exit fee W $300,000  
Annual discount rate ρ 0.05  
Annualized growth rate of O&M cost αC 0.04 
Annualized volatility of O&M cost σC 0.10 
 
As explained in Assumption 2, the linkage between the capacity and production 
quantity is as follows. Let us assume that the total number of hours of operations per year is 
given by 8,760 hours. Then, as the production quantity per year as well as the nameplate 
capacity and capacity factor are assumed to be constant, 3*0.3333*1*8,760 8,760(K = =
MWh/yr). 
2.6.2. The Entry/Exit Decisions 
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By applying the parameter values to (2.7) - (2.10) and (13), the threshold values of *C  
and 0C  ($/MWh) as well as the function of ( )V C  can be calculated. At the same time with 0C , 
we can use (2.15) to calculate T  as well. The numerical results are summarized in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Numerical results of the entry/exit decisions 
β1 1.2170 
A1 300, 800 
C* 55.7623  
0C  30.0549
 
 
V(C) 1.2170300,800 876,000 8,409,600C C− +
 
T
 
17.6592 
 
We do note that, the first term of ( )V C  is the option value to exit, the second term is 
the O&M cost, and the third term is the revenue. Also, given 0C  value of 30.0549, it can be 
verified that 0( )V C  is 1,000,000, which is the initial investment. Furthermore, if a firm is 
considering entry, given the initial O&M cost, we can calculate the expected life of a new wind 
farm by (2.14). Likewise, if a firm is currently operating the wind farm, then given the current 
O&M cost, we can calculate the remaining life of the existing wind farm by (2.11). 
Figure 2.1 shows the value of the project with respect to the O&M cost when the wind 
farm is in operation. As indicated in the graph, the value of the project decreases as the O&M 
cost increases until it reaches *C . Once the cost reaches the exit threshold, the firm will pay 
the exit fee to abandon the wind farm and thus ( )EXV C W= − .  
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Figure 2.1 Value of the project vs. the O&M cost 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Entry/exit thresholds vs. the volatility of O&M cost 
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In Figure 2.2 above, the thresholds of the O&M cost *C  and 0C
 
are depicted with 
respect to the O&M cost volatility. Both threshold values increase as the O&M cost becomes 
more volatile, which indicates that a higher degree of volatility will delay the exit and allow 
more (O&M cost-wise) marginal firms to enter. It is interesting to note that the slope is much 
steeper for the exit threshold than that for the entry threshold as the volatility increases. i.e., it 
seems that the exit threshold is more sensitive to volatility than the entry threshold is (Note 
that the entry cost is at time zero while the exit cost is some time in the future). 
In Figure 2.3, the thresholds of the O&M cost *C  and 0C
 
are depicted with respect to 
the O&M cost growth rate. Both threshold values decrease as the growth rate increases. This 
implies that a higher growth rate of the O&M cost induces an early exit and allows marginal 
firms to enter the market. 
 
Figure 2.3 Entry/exit thresholds vs. the growth rate of O&M cost 
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In Figure 2.4, the thresholds of the O&M cost *C  and 0C
 
are depicted with respect to 
the exit fee. As we can see from the graph, as the exit fee increases, the exit threshold increases, 
which leads the existing producer to delay abandoning. At the same time, it allows marginal 
firms to enter the market, reducing the total power production from wind energy. 
 
Figure 2.4 Entry/exit thresholds vs. the exit fee 
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Figure 2.5 Entry threshold vs. the growth rate and volatility of O&M cost 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Exit threshold vs. the growth rate and volatility of O&M cost 
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We note that this type of bi-directional analyses can be conducted for the remaining 
parameters  
2.6.3. Monte Carlo Simulation 
In the previous subsections, the value of a wind farm project, the entry/exit thresholds 
of the O&M cost, and the expected economic life are calculated based on the fixed hypothetical 
data. In this section, in contrast, Monte Carlo simulation is used to simulate sample paths given 
0 0C C= =30.0549 $/MWh as the starting point and the GBM process as 
0.04 0.10dC Cdt Cdz= +  
A typical sample path is shown below in Figure 2.7 with the horizontal axis as the time 
(year) and the vertical axis as the O&M cost ($/MWh). 
 
Figure 2.7 Sample path of a wind farm’s O&M cost in 20 years 
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In our study, We generated such GBM paths for 1,000 times, given all parameters and 
time horizons as we indicated before. The algorithm of computing the expected marginal 
economic life *T  is simply presented as follows:  
Initiation: Set 0index = ∅
 
and 1j = . 
Step 1: Generate a GBM process and find the first time it hits *C as jt . If it does not 
exit, let 60jt = . { }1index ,indexj j jt −= . Go to step 2. 
Step 2: 1j j= + .  If 1,000j > , go to step 3; otherwise go to step 1. 
Step 3:  Calculate the mean value of all elements in 1index j−  then STOP. 
By executing this simple algorithm, we compute the mean value of the economic life 
to be 17.4115 years, which, is fairly close to the analytical expected value of 17.6592 years 
that we obtained in the previous subsection. The difference becomes negligible once more 
simulations are run. Finally, we note that in this algorithm, there is one minor “adjustment” as 
follows. We implicitly assumed that the maximum physical life with all the repair and 
maintenance to be 60 years. Hence, any simulation run that was not reaching *C
 
in 60 years 
was terminated and we entered its age as 60 years. By running the Monte Carlo simulation 
with 60 years for 1,000 times, we have the result showing that the possibility of a wind farm 
not to retire within 60 years is less than 1%. Hence, we believe that this adjustment is indeed 
minor. 
2.7 Discussion on Policy Implications and Assumptions 
This section consists of two discussion items: policy implications and assumptions. Let 
us first address the policy implications. As shown in the previous two sensitivity analysis 
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sections on exit and entry decisions, as the exit fee W  increases, the exit threshold *C  
increases. This implies that the government could increase the length of the economic life of 
the renewable site by imposing or increasing the exit fee. At the same time, as W  increases, 
the entry threshold 0C  decreases. That is, the number of firms that would enter into the 
renewable power market will decrease as the government imposes or increases the exit fee. 
Interestingly, the firms that would be able to enter the renewable power market will have a 
lower level of 0C , which will increase the economic life of the renewable site.  
Hence, the government’s exit fee can be viewed as a policy tool to increase the 
economic life of a renewable site in two different ways. First, it achieves this objective by 
increasing the exit threshold *C . Concurrently, it reduces the entry threshold 0C , contributing 
positively to the same objective. 
Moreover, we recall that, as the initial investment I  decreases, the entry threshold 0C  
increases. Hence, if the government provides an initial subsidy, it can be interpreted that more 
firms will be able to enter. On the other hand, the marginal firms that enter will have a higher 
level of the initial O&M cost, which will only increase expected value-wise. In this sense, the 
initial subsidy encourages the premature exit of the (marginal) renewable sites. In view of this 
observation, let us consider the following scenario.  
If the government subsidy is provided as a constant matching fund to C throughout the 
duration of the renewable site operation, this will directly extend the economic life of many 
renewable sites through an increase in pre-subsidy *C . At the same time, more marginal 
renewable sites will enter through an increase in pre-subsidy 0C . In this case, both expected 
economic life and production of electric power from the renewable energy increase.  
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From our observation, it is certainly worthwhile to investigate the conversion of the 
initial subsidy to the O&M subsidy. We note that, the O&M cost subsidy is different from the 
production tax credit (PTC) currently in use in the U.S. because the PTC is front-loaded for 
early years only, and is under the assumption that a sufficient amount of tax has already been 
paid to the government (see e.g., Wiser et al., 2007a).  
Finally, we caution that, for a thorough investigation, the total benefit vs. cost will have 
to be quantified, which will critically depend on the distribution of firms over key parameters 
such as 0C . For example, even in a simpler case of imposing a scalar W, it is recommended 
that the government strike a careful balance between one environmentally desirable goal of 
preventing premature exit (relative to the physical life of the renewable site) and another 
environmentally desirable goal of encouraging the entry of firms to the renewable power 
market, and increase the production of electric power from the renewable energy as the 
distribution of such firms over 0C  values may be far from certain. 
So far, we have discussed the policy implications. Now we proceed to discuss the 
assumptions. The most fundamental assumption in our model is that the O&M cost ($/MWh) 
follows GBM process and some cases have been referred earlier in this paper to support this 
assumption. We note that, in these referred cases, the cost is random over a period, and the 
expected cost as well as the volatility of the cost are increasing.  
In the case of the wind farm, we can make similar observations on the O&M cost. In 
EWEA (2004, pp. 101), some of the O&M cost paths over time of wind turbines meet these 
characteristics. Qualitatively, Wiser and Bolinger (2008) reported that the average O&M cost 
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of a wind turbine ($/MWh) ‘appears to increase with project age’, while some other authors 
claimed that the operating and maintenance costs escalate over time (Wilkinson, 2010). 
In practice, we envision that first the raw data on the daily production as well as O&M 
cost of the renewable site will be recorded over a period. From these data, we will obtain the 
O&M cost per MWh data. We note that once enough of these O&M data become available in 
the future, more rigorous tests to see the degree of fit can be administered using various 
statistical tools (e.g. Postali and Picchetti, 2006).  
In terms of the relaxation of simplifying assumptions, the power production quantity, 
capacity, and contract power price seem all worthwhile. In the case of power production 
quantity, a simulation model can accommodate the daily (perhaps hourly) fluctuation of the 
power production, taking the specific technological characteristics (wind speed, daylight 
availability, etc.) into account. Such a simulation will add numerical and computational 
insights to more tactical decisions of temporary contraction or expansion such as partial shut-
down due to seasonality. 
In the case of capacity, the granularity will be a central question. As the renewable site 
is subdivided into smaller groups (until an individual renewable generator such as a wind 
turbine or a solar panel), there will be an explosive number of options for partial shut-downs 
and gradual entries. We acknowledge that such features will add realism to the models studied 
here. However, the analytic tractability of any such extension remains to be seen. 
Finally, for the contract power price, as mentioned previously, certainly a power price 
following a separate GBM will allow us to model the option to wait before any entry. With 
this parallel GBM process, whether the numerical and computational analyses (analytic 
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solutions are not likely) can exploit the interaction of the price and O&M cost GBM’s and 
yield unambiguous insights will be a significant future challenge. 
2.8 Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we modeled and analyzed how economically rational decision maker of 
a renewable site will exit and enter when the O&M cost is represented by a GBM process 
where the renewable site is without any input fuel cost. For such a site, we obtained the 
threshold level of the O&M cost above which a currently operating renewable site will exit. 
We also obtained the threshold level of the O&M cost below which a new renewable site will 
enter.  
Based on these two findings, we conducted extensive sensitivity analyses with respect 
to various critical parameters with major policy implications. For example, the exit fee by the 
government will help in preventing premature exit relative to the physical life. At the same 
time, such a fee will prevent O&M cost-wise marginal firms from entering the market, which 
reduces the total production amount of electric power from the renewable energy. Moreover, 
the government subsidy for the initial investment is shown to allow the O&M cost-wise 
marginal firms to enter the market, of which renewable sites have a shorter expected economic 
life relative to the physical life. At the same time, such entries will increase the total production 
amount of electric power from the renewable energy. 
As an alternative, it is desirable to investigate diverting the subsidy on the initial 
investment to the subsidy on the O&M cost as the O&M cost subsidy will extend the expected 
economic life. At the same time, more O&M cost-wise marginal firms will enter the market, 
which will increase the total production amount of electric power from the renewable energy.  
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We note that for conclusive results over competing policies, the total benefit and cost 
must be quantified, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this paper has 
discovered a much plausible alternative subsidy to the current government policy of front-
loading grants and incentives in the initial and early years of renewable site operations. 
As this paper can be seen as an initial exploration, there are numerous worthwhile 
future studies. Specifically, it may be worthwhile to relax each simplifying assumption, and 
examine the ramifications of such relaxation. For example, by assuming no prior power 
purchase contract, the electric power price can be modeled as a separate GBM process. This 
type of endeavor will enhance the realism of our study, and widen the applicability of our 
models. 
In addition, as the data on O&M costs across renewable sites accumulate, it is 
worthwhile to measure the degree of the fitness for the GBM assumption. As such a degree is 
typically far from being binary, we do anticipate differing degree of fitness across renewable 
sites. However, such an examination will enhance our ability to fine-tune the exact GBM 
process (out of so many GBM inspired processes) and their corresponding parameter values. 
Moreover, one could consider a single firm with multiple sites of the same or different 
renewable energies whose O&M costs may be positively/negatively correlated. Other 
expansions could include a competitive model of single-site firms of the same or different 
renewable energies as well as the management of changing technology with respect to time. 
Finally, we note that, the massive abandonment of 1990’s has already happened in the 
renewable power industries including the wind and solar power producers. Given the current 
expansion of these industries across the U.S. and other countries, we believe that the questions 
raised and addressed (to a varying degree) in this paper are timely (if not urgent), and we hope 
36 
 
that this paper contributes positively to the possible future resolution involving aging and 
retiring renewable sites as well as alternative energy facilities of similar economic and 
environmental characteristics (to a degree, biomass and waste energy). 
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CHAPTER 3 . REPOWERING AND EXIT DECISIONS FOR 
RENEWABLE POWER PRODUCERS 
 
In this chapter, our objectives are to understand (1) how renewable power producers 
make economically rational decisions regarding their current (aging) plants such as repowering 
or exiting and (2) how they respond to various government incentives and fees. For example, 
what kinds of incentives would expedite or delay repowering? 
In this study of renewable power producers, we focus on the following three types of 
decision makers. Type I: large utilities with multiple means of generation such as coal and gas 
as well as wind and solar energy. It is extremely rare that a company of this type would consider 
abandoning a single renewable power production site, and in modeling their behavior, we 
assume that there exists only the repowering option (i.e., simply walking away is not an option). 
Type II: merchant generators with a single means of renewable power generation – typically 
medium size, and Type III: QF’s with a single means of renewable power generation – typically 
small size. Type II companies are independent power producers who get paid according to the 
prevailing market price and Type III companies are qualifying facilities that get paid according 
to heavily favorable standard offer contracts. In both cases, repowering as well as abandonment 
are entirely plausible options for the renewable power producers.  
For all three types of renewable power producers, as a first step to achieve the 
aforementioned two objectives, we present in this paper the mathematical models for such 
renewable power producers who face uncertain but on average increasing O&M costs and view 
repowering or exiting as a real option.  
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We first present a brief literature review 
on relevant publications in Section 3.1.  In Section 3.2 we first formulate a repowering decision 
model for a Type I producer, and derive the repowering threshold in terms of the O&M cost. 
This is followed by sensitivity analysis in Section 3.3 with respect to critical parameters. In 
Section 3.4 we extend the basic model to the case of a Type II or Type III producer who now 
has an option to exit as well as to repower. This is followed by another round of sensitivity 
analysis in Section 3.5. We then discuss the policy ramifications of what we have learned in 
Section 3.6, and illustrate some of the key features via an extensive numerical example in 
Section 3.7. Finally, we make concluding remarks and comment on future research in Section 
3.8.  
3.1 Literature Review 
For this study, there are several streams of relevant publications. First, for the uncertain 
and on average increasing O&M cost, Ye (1990) derived the replacement policies under a 
GBM O&M cost. In Costa Lima and Suslick (2006), for mining projects, both selling price 
and operating cost are modeled as GBM processes. Next, for the decommissioning and 
replacement analysis, Takashima et al. (2007) investigated a real options approach in the 
context of nuclear power plants. For a more classical approach of replacement analysis, 
Hartman and Murphy (2006) examined equipment replacement policies under finite planning 
horizon. As for the repowering and exit decisions and policies of renewable power producers, 
Rio et al. (2011) presented a qualitative analysis of repowering policies. In Min, Lou, and 
Wang (2012) a real options approach is used to explain economically rational entry and exit 
strategies for renewable power producers. Fleten and Maribu (2004) addressed the investment 
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timing and capacity choice of wind power under uncertainty under a fixed quantity contract. 
Specifically they assumed the decision maker has a deferrable opportunity to invest in one 
turbine out of a set of candidates with different capacity. 
In contrast to these papers, our paper’s unique contributions are (1) the mathematically 
concrete modeling of the renewable power producers’ decisions on repowering or exit options 
when the O&M cost follows a GBM process, and (2) explicit policy implications of various 
possible government subsidies on expediting or delaying repowering/exiting with respect to 
not only the direction, but also the magnitude. 
3.2 Basic Model Formulation and Solution 
In this section, we consider a Type I firm with a single renewable power plant that is 
currently in operation. We note that, throughout this chapter, this site will be referred to as a 
plant. For example, in the case of wind power, a plant may consist of hundreds of wind towers. 
We also note that, in this section, for the decision maker of this firm, we assume that there 
exists an option to upgrade the plant with typically much larger capacity due to technological 
advancement, and this upgrading will be referred to as repowering. 
Prior to the model formulation, we make the following critical assumptions that enable 
us to focus on the study of economically rational repowering decisions and to maintain 
mathematical derivations tractable. We note that we define indicator variable i  such that 1i =   
designates the current plant while 2i =  designates the repowered plant.  
Assumption 1: For both current and repowering plant, there exists a power purchase 
agreement between the plant and a utility company with an appropriate transmission 
connection at a fixed selling price of iP  ($/MWh) at any time point. Examples of the fixed 
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energy pricing can be found in Fixed Energy Prices for Renewable (PG&E, 2012a) and E-SRG 
PPA (PG&E, 2012b). 
Assumption 2: In making the repowering decision, the decision maker will rely on the 
fixed (expected) production quantity per unit time. Specifically, we will utilize the fixed annual 
production quantity, iK  (MWh per year), which equals to the nameplate capacity times the 
capacity factor (see e.g., Wiser and Bolinger, 2007). 
Assumption 3: For both plants, the operation and maintenance cost (O&M cost; $/MWh) 
at any time point, iC , follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) processes. Specifically, 
i ii C i C i
dC C dt C dzα σ= +
                                                                                             
(3.1) 
where 
iC
α  is the instantaneous growth rate of the O&M cost (% per year), 
iC
σ  is the 
instantaneous volatility of iC  (% per square root of year), and dz  is the increment of a 
standard Wiener process z  ( tdz dtε=  where ~ (0,1)t Nε ). 
Assumption 4: As for the planning horizon, repowering will be executed only once. i.e., 
the producer is assumed to be unable or unwilling to re-repower its repowered plant. In other 
words, the decision left to be made is with respect to when to terminate the repowered plant 
and exit the market. The reason to do so is as follows: theoretically the producer can keep 
repowering into an infinite horizon, which makes the problem analytically intractable. 
However, the forecast-horizon theory seriously questions the relevance and value of the 
information beyond a certain finite horizon (Chand, et al., 2002) as the forecasted information 
many years into the future may have little chance of any meaningful accuracy. Appendix A.2 
provides an analytical comparison of this same problem with assumption of repowering twice.   
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 Assumption 5: The remaining cost components are irrelevant to the decision maker 
regarding the option to repower and then exit. Also, we are assuming that the rest of the cost 
components such as administrative costs, insurance, tax, etc. are negligible for our planning 
purposes. 
Under these assumptions, the problem can be separated into two sequential stages, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1, where to repower current plant occurs at 
rτ  and to terminate the 
repowered one occurs at Dτ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Basic model timeline 
 
Under stochastic O&M cost, the value of the basic model from following an optimal 
policy can be written as (see e.g., Stokey (2008)): 
1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
0
( ) sup E ( ) ( ) ( )
r D
r D
r
t t t t
c r
C c
F c e P C K dt W I e e P C K dt W e
τ τ
ρτ ρτρ ρ
τ
− −− −
≥
 
= − − + + − − 
  
∫ ∫ 
 
where [ ]Ec ⋅  denotes an expected value conditional on the initial state. 
We notice that each of the decision can be viewed as an individual optimal-stopping 
problem, and therefore we solve the problem backwards by starting with the final stage, where 
the repowering plant is operating and the time to exit needs to be determined. According to 
t=0 t=τr 
Current time                      To repower                     To exit 
t=τD 
Time t 
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Dixit and Pindyck (1994), there exist a single scalar threshold of *2C  such that it is optimal to 
exit if 2C  is between *2[ , )C ∞ .  
As long as it is not optimal to abandon the repowered plant (i.e., in the continuation 
region), the value function of the repowered plant 2 2( )V C  must satisfy the following 
differential equation, which results from Bellman’s principle of optimality (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994): 
( ) [ ]2 2 2 2 2EV dt P C K dt dVρ = − +                                                                                (3.2) 
where ρ  is the annual discount rate (% per year). 
The structure of (3.2) can be explained in the same fashion as for (2.2) in Chapter 2. 
By Ito’s lemma, 2dV  could be expanded as 
( )2 2 2
2
2 22 2 2
2 2 2 22
2 2
1
2C C C
V V VdV C dt C dz C dt
t C C
α σ σ
∂ ∂ ∂
= + + +
∂ ∂ ∂                                                                                
We note that we are considering an indefinite horizon problem here so 2 2( )V C
 
is time 
invariant. Hence, 2 0V
t
∂
=
∂
 and the above equation becomes 
( )2 2 2
2
2 22 2
2 2 2 22
2 2
1
2C C C
V VdV C dt C dz C dt
C C
α σ σ
∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂
                                                    
(3.3) 
Substituting 2dV  in (3.3) into (3.2) we have  
( ) ( )2 2 2
2
2 22 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 22
2 2
1E
2C C C
V VV dt P C K dt C dt C dz C dt
C C
ρ α σ σ ∂ ∂= − + + + ∂ ∂ 
 
Since [ ]E 0dz = , we have 
2
2
2
2
E 0C
V C dz
C
σ
 ∂
= ∂ 
, and the above equation can be 
simplified as 
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( )
2 2
2
2 22 2
2 2 2 2 2 22
2 2
1
2C C
V VV dt P C K dt C dt C dt
C C
ρ α σ∂ ∂= − + +
∂ ∂
                                                              
 
By dividing both sides by dt  and grouping terms we have  
2 2
2
2 22 2
2 2 2 2 2 22
2 2
1 ( ) 0
2 C C
V VC C V P C K
C C
σ α ρ∂ ∂+ − + − =
∂ ∂
                                                 
(3.4) 
Equation (3.4) is an ordinary differential equation (ODE). To guarantee its convergence 
as well as economic meaning, we impose that 
2C
α ρ<  (Costa Lima and Suslick, 2006).  
We note that the annual discount rate ρ
 
is also referred commonly as the expected rate 
of return if we resolve the same problem using the different approach of contingent claims 
analysis. In contingent claims analysis, this rate in practice has the interpretation as the 
opportunity cost of capital, and can be calculated by the CAPM model. 
The following boundary conditions between the operating and exit states are needed to 
obtain the optimal threshold *2C . 
*
2 2 2( )V C W= −
                                                                                                             
(3.5)
 
*
2 2'( ) 0V C =                                                                                                                 (3.6) 
where 2W  represents the exit fee for the repowered plant (e.g., expense of land restoration, etc.). 
The value-matching condition (3.5) requires that at the exit threshold, the value of the 
repowered plant project equals to the value of exit. The smooth-pasting condition (3.6) ensures 
that *2C  is the optimal exercise point by requiring the continuance and smoothness of 2 2( )V C  
at *2C . 
The structure of the solution contains the general solution of the homogeneous part of 
(3.4) as well as a particular solution to the full equation, which is in the form of 
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( )1 2 22 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) CV C AC A C C K P Kβ β ρ α ρ= + − − +  
where
 
1β  and 2β  are the roots of the characteristic quadratic equation as 
2 2 2
2 2 21 1 0
2 2C C C
σ β α σ β ρ + − − = 
 
                                                                                         Solving the quadratic equation we have 
( )2 2 2 2 2 222 2 2 21 1 2 1 2 2 1C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − + >    
( )2 2 2 2 2 222 2 2 22 1 2 1 2 2 0C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − − − + <    
We also note that when 2 0C → , i.e., the O&M cost becomes negligible, the repowered 
plant will not be abandoned, which indicates that the value of the option to abandon approaches 
zero, therefore 2 0A = . After eliminating this speculative bubble, the general solution then 
becomes 
( )1 22 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( ) CV C AC C K P Kβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                            
(3.7)
 
Solving (7) with boundary conditions, we have 
     
 
( )( )
( )
22 2 2 1*
2
1 21
CP K WC
K
ρ ρ α β
β
+ −
=
−
                                                                              
(3.8)
 
( ) ( ) 12
2
1 1
*
1 2C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                                                          
(3.9) 
Before the decision maker decides to exit (i.e., the decision maker is still holding the 
option to exit), the value of the repowered plant consists two parts: the value of the operating 
plant and the value of the option to exit. 
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Based on this, (3.7) could be interpreted as follows: The first term is the value of the 
option to exit while the last two terms are the value of the operating repowered plant when the 
decision maker has to keep it operating despite any losses, given an infinite operating horizon. 
In other words, that last two terms represent the expected cost and revenue streams when the 
initial price and cost are observed as 2P  and 2C .  
We note that 02C
 
will be the initial cost at any time point when (i.e., whenever) the 
repowered plant starts to operate. Thus the value of the repowering project will be  
( ) ( )1 20 0 02 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( ) CV C A C C K P Kβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                     
(3.10) 
The expected economic life of the repowered plant can be derived as 
( ) ( )2 2* * 0 22 2 2ln ln 1 2C CT C C α σ= − −
                                                                        
(3.11)
 
The derivation of (3.11) is briefly given as follows: Let 2 2( ) lnF C C= , 2( )dF C  can be 
expanded by Ito’s lemma as ( )2 2 222( ) 1 2C C CdF C dt dzα σ σ= − + . Hence, for any finite time 
period T , the change in 2( )F C  is distributed with mean ( )2 221 2C C Tα σ−  and variance 22C Tσ . 
Hence the expected first passage time of *2C  can be calculated as 
( ) ( )2 2* 0 22 2ln ln 1 2C CC C α σ− − . 
Now we proceed to move backward and examine stage one. That is, under what 
circumstance the decision maker will decide to repower the current (aging) plant? We define 
the repowering threshold of current plant’s O&M cost as *1C  so that the producer will repower 
when *1 1[ , ]C C∈ ∞ . The optimality equation for the value of current plant 1 1( )V C  can be 
derived in a similar fashion. That is, 
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( ) [ ]1 1 1 1 1EV dt P C K dt dVρ = − +  
By applying Ito’s lemma, we can obtain an ODE in a similar way as we did for stage 
two:  
1 1
2
2 21 1
1 1 1 1 1 12
1 1
1 ( ) 0
2 C C
V VC C V P C K
C C
σ α ρ∂ ∂+ − + − =
∂ ∂
                                                   
(3.12)
 
Also, similarly, the following boundary conditions need to be satisfied.  
* 0
1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) rV C V C W I= − −
                                                                                                             
*
1 1'( ) 0V C =  
where 
r
W  represents the partial decommissioning cost of the current plant (total 
decommissioning typically is not necessary for repowering) and 2I  is the investment cost of 
repowering. We will assume that 02 2 2( ) 0rV C W I− − > . That is, the partial decommissioning 
cost and the investment cost of the repowering are sufficiently low that the net value is positive.  
Now the solution of (3.12) can be derived as follows: 
( )3 11 1 3 1 1 1 1 1( ) CV C A C C K PKβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                              
(3.13)
 
where ( )1 1 1 1 1 122 2 2 23 1 2 1 2 2C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − +  
                                              
(3.14) 
           
( ) ( )
( )
1
0
1 1 2 2 2 3*
1
3 11
r CPK V C W IC
K
ρ ρ α β
β
 
− + + − 
=
−
                                                        
(3.15)
                                   
( ) ( ) 31
1
3 1
*
3 1C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                                                        
(3.16) 
If we denote the initial O&M cost of the current plant as 01C , the value of the current 
plant can be expressed as 
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( ) ( )3 10 0 01 1 3 1 1 1 1 1( ) CV C A C C K PKβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                       
(3.17)
 
We can also derive the expected economic life of the current plant as 
( ) ( )1 1* * 0 21 1 1ln ln 1 2C CT C C α σ= − −
                                                                         
(3.18)
 
3.3 Basic Model Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we further explore and analyze the properties of the optimal repowering 
strategy in the basic model by performing sensitivity analysis as follows: on the optimal exit 
threshold *2C
 
with respect to repowered plant’s critical parameters, the optimal repowering 
threshold *1C
 
with respect to current plant’s critical parameters, and *1C
 
with respect to 
repowered plant’s critical parameters. 
Specifically, let us first examine *2C  in (3.8) with respect to the repowered plant’s 
critical parameters of 
2C
α , 
2C
σ , 2W , 2P , and 2K . It can be mathematically proved that 
2
*
2 0CC α∂ ∂ < , 2
*
2 0CC σ∂ ∂ > , *2 2 0C W∂ ∂ > , *2 2 0C P∂ ∂ > , and *2 2 0C K∂ ∂ < , assuming 
that 
2
0 Cα ρ< < . Recalling the expected economic life in (3.11), it can be shown that 
2
*
2 0CT α∂ ∂ < , 2
*
2 0CT σ∂ ∂ > ,  *2 2 0T W∂ ∂ > , *2 2 0T P∂ ∂ > , and *2 2 0T K∂ ∂ < .  
The result above implies that the volatility in the O&M cost may delay the exit of the 
repowered plant in the sense that the higher volatility leads to the higher threshold value for 
the exit. (i.e., with higher volatility, there is a greater chance that the O&M cost may actually 
decrease in the near future). The result also implies that a higher growth rate 
2C
α  as well as a 
higher level of repowering capacity 2K  encourages the producer to walk away earlier as it 
reduces the exit threshold. The greater capacity implies a higher level of the O&M cost impact 
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on the project value as the O&M cost unit is $ per MWh. Moreover, a higher level of exit fee 
2W  delays walking away for the reason that the exit option is less favorable.  
Let us now examine *1C  with respect to current plant’s critical parameters of 1Cα , 1Cσ , 
r
W , 1P , and 1K . It can be verified that 1
*
1 0CC α∂ ∂ < , 1
*
1 0CC σ∂ ∂ > , *1 0rC W∂ ∂ > , 
*
1 1 0C P∂ ∂ > , and *1 1 0C K∂ ∂ > , assuming that 10 Cα ρ< < . Recalling the expected economic 
life in (3.18), we also have 
1
*
1 0CT α∂ ∂ < , 1
*
1 0CT σ∂ ∂ > , *1 0rT W∂ ∂ > , *1 1 0T P∂ ∂ > , and 
*
1 1 0T K∂ ∂ > ,. The corresponding interpretation can be made in a similar way. In particular, 
with respect to 1K  we note that a higher level of capacity 1K  delays repowering. This is 
because, with a higher level of capacity, the total revenue generated at 1P  dollars per MWh 
increases, and affords the decision maker to continue to operate the current plant a little longer.  
Finally, in this section, we examine *1C  with respect to the repowered plant’s critical 
parameters 2K , 2I , and 2P . We note that the levels of the capacity, repowering investment cost, 
and selling price are often known or forecasted a priori for planning purposes.  
First, for 2K , because 
( ) ( )
( )
1
0
*
2 2 2 31
2 2 3 11
CV C IC
K K K
ρ α β
β
 ∂ − + −∂  
= ⋅
∂ ∂ −
, the sign of *1 2C K∂ ∂  is 
the same as ( )02 2 2 2V C I K ∂ − + ∂  . Furthermore, it can be verified that 
( )0 *2 2 2 2 1 20 0V C I K C K ∂ − + ∂ < ⇒ ∂ ∂ <    . This has a significant implication. Namely, a 
larger capacity level of the repowered plant expedites repowering by reducing the repowering 
threshold. Intuitively, when the repowered plant’s capacity increases, the value of the 
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repowered plant increases as well. This increases the economic attractiveness of exercising this 
option, and the decision maker expedites repowering. 
As for 2I  and 2P , it can be easily verified that 
*
1 2 0C I∂ ∂ >  and *1 2 0C P∂ ∂ < . The 
interpretation is that as the repowering investment cost increases, repowering is delayed while 
as the repowered selling price increases, repowering is expedited. 
3.4 Extension of Basic Model: Two Alternatives 
In this section, we extend the basic model by considering other types of renewable 
power producers, namely, Types II and III in the Introduction section. In this extension, the 
decision maker has an option to repower as well as an option to simply terminate the current 
plant and walk away. 
The decision timeline is shown in Figure 3.2, where the producer either exits at dτ
 
or 
repower at 
rτ . And Dτ
 
represents the terminal time of the repowered plant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Extended model timeline 
 
The value of the extended model from following an optimal policy can be written as 
{ } { }1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
0
( ) sup E ( ) ( ) ( )
r d D
dr D
r d r d
r
t t t t
c r
C c
F c e P C K dt I W I e e P C K dt W e I We
τ τ τ
ρτρτ ρτρ ρ
τ τ τ τ
τ
∧
−− −− −
< ≥
≥
  
 = − + − + + − − − 
    
∫ ∫ 
where {}I ⋅  is an indicator function. 
t=0 t=τd^ τr 
Current time                         To exit/repower                      To exit  
t=τD 
Time t 
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Within this framework, the calculation of the repowering project’s value (i.e., stage two 
if executed) is the same as before, and we will use the same mathematical expressions from 
the basic model. 
However, at stage one, the options to repower and to exit coexist and thus each of these 
options has to be evaluated in the presence of the other one. As in Fleten and Maribu (2004), 
we treat these two options as two mutually exclusive alternatives and proceed as follows. First, 
we analyze the two options individually using Bellman’s optimality principle and Ito’s lemma. 
Because in each case the threshold is a single cut-off separating the continuation and stopping 
regions, they can both be treated as optimal-stopping problems and solved in a way similar to 
one in the basic model.
 For clarity, we define 1rC  as the optimal repowering threshold of the current plant’s 
O&M cost if only the repowering option is available and 1 1( )rV C  as the corresponding current 
plant value function, given the O&M cost is 1C . It is easy to see that this case is equivalent to 
our basic model and the solution is as follows: 
( )3 11 1 3 1 1 1 1 1( )r r CV C A C C K PKβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                            
(3.19) 
( ) ( )
( )
1
0
1 1 2 2 2 3
1
3 11
r Cr
PK V C W I
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
 
− + + − 
=
−
                                                       
(3.20) 
( ) ( ) 31
1
3 1
3 1
r
r
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                                                       
(3.21)
 
Unlike a Type I producer described in the basic model, for a Type II or Type III 
producer, the value of repowered plant is no longer assumed to be positive. For example, unlike 
the large, well-established firms that typically belong to Type I producers, some Type II or 
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Type III producers may face economically negative consequences due to financing problems, 
ownership changes, and market competition.  
Next, we also define 1dC  as the optimal exit threshold of the current plant’s O&M cost 
if only the exit option is available and 1 1( )dV C  as the corresponding current plant value 
function, given the O&M cost is 1C . Following similar steps, we have 
( )3 11 1 3 1 1 1 1 1( )d d CV C A C C K PKβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                           
(3.22) 
[ ]( )
( )
11 1 1 3
1
3 11
Cd
PK W
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
+ −
=
−
                                                                              
(3.23) 
( ) ( ) 31
1
3 1
3 1
d
d
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                                                      
(3.24)
 
We now proceed to put the two options together and re-evaluate the value of each 
option. According to Fleten and Maribu (2004), when there are two mutually exclusive 
alternatives available, it is now optimal to wait until the lowest 1iC  where the value to execute 
the alternative i is worth more than the value to execute any other alternatives. Following this 
rule, we examine 1
rC  and 1dC
 
to find the optimal decision. For that, the following three cases 
can be mathematically derived: 
i) When 1 1r dC C< , i.e., 02 2 2 1( ) rV C W I W− − > − , it is optimal to repower when O&M 
cost hits 1
rC ; 
ii) When 1 1r dC C> , i.e., 02 2 2 1( ) rV C W I W− − < − , it is optimal to exit when O&M cost 
hits 1
dC ; 
iii) When 1 1r dC C= , i.e., 02 2 2 1( ) rV C W I W− − = − , it is optimal to do either. 
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The three cases above can be synthesized into one explicit decision rule: *1 1 1r dC C C= ∧ . 
We note that, compared to the basic model, the Type II or Type III producer may find it optimal 
to exit as the repowering option is simply not attractive enough for the producer to continue. 
3.5 Extended Model Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we conduct the sensitivity analysis as follows: on the repowered plant’s 
optimal exit threshold *2C
 
with respect to its critical parameters, the current plant’s optimal 
repower/exit threshold *1C
 
with respect to its critical parameters as well as with respect to some 
of repowered plant’s critical parameters. 
The sensitivity results of *2C  are the same as in the basic model, i.e.,
 
2
*
2 0CC α∂ ∂ < , 
2
*
2 0CC σ∂ ∂ > , *2 2 0C W∂ ∂ > , *2 2 0C P∂ ∂ > , and *2 2 0C K∂ ∂ < . For *1C , the sensitivity 
analysis is more complicated. We start with the parameters that do not affect the optimality 
criterion (i.e., 02 2 2 1( ) rV C W I W− − > −
 
or not). These parameters are: 
1C
α , 
1C
σ , 1P , and 1K . The 
result is summarized as follows: 
When Case i) holds, then *1 1rC C= . For this case, 1
*
1 0CC α∂ ∂ < , 1
*
1 0CC σ∂ ∂ > , 
*
1 1 0C P∂ ∂ > . For *1 1C K∂ ∂ , we have *1 1 0C K∂ ∂ >  if 02 2 2( ) 0rV C W I− − >  and *1 1 0C K∂ ∂ ≤
 
otherwise.  
 When Case ii) or Case iii) holds, then *1 1dC C= . For such a case, 1
*
1 0CC α∂ ∂ < , 
1
*
1 0CC σ∂ ∂ > , *1 1 0C P∂ ∂ > , and *1 1 0C K∂ ∂ < . 
We now proceed to analyze the parameters which affect the optimal criterion itself. 
These parameters are: 
r
W , 2I , 2K , 2P , and 1W . The results are summarized as follows: 
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1) Analysis of 
r
W
 
When 02 2 2 1( )rW V C I W< − + , Case i) holds and *1 1rC C= , hence *1 0rC W∂ ∂ > . 
When 02 2 2 1( )rW V C I W> − + , Case ii) holds and *1 1dC C= , hence *1 0rC W∂ ∂ = . 
When 02 2 2 1( )rW V C I W= − + , Case iii) holds at a kink and no straightforward expression 
of *1 rC W∂ ∂
 
exists. 
The interpretations are as follows. If the net value of the repowering project is greater 
than the exit fee of the current plant, then the repowering option will be used (not the exit 
option), and as the partial decommissioning cost increases the repowering threshold also 
increases. If the net value of the repowering project is smaller than the exit fee of the current 
plant, then the exit option will be used, and the increase in the partial decommissioning cost 
has no effect on the exit threshold. At the kink, 
*
1
0
lim 0
rW
r
C
W−∆ →
∆
>
∆
 while 
*
1
0
lim 0
rW
r
C
W+∆ →
∆
=
∆
. We note 
that for the remainder of the sensitivity analyses, similar interpretations can be made. 
2) Analysis of 2I
 
When 02 2 2 1( ) rI V C W W< − + , Case i) holds and *1 1rC C= , hence *1 2 0C I∂ ∂ > ; 
When 02 2 2 1( ) rI V C W W> − + , Case ii) holds and *1 1dC C= , hence *1 2 0C I∂ ∂ = ; 
When 02 2 2 1( ) rI V C W W= − + , Case iii) holds at a kink and no straightforward expression 
of *1 2C I∂ ∂
 
exists. 
3) Analysis of 2K  
When 2 2K k> , Case i) holds and *1 1rC C= , hence *1 2 0C K∂ ∂ < ; 
When 2 2K k< , Case ii) holds and *1 1dC C= , hence *1 2 0C K∂ ∂ = ; 
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When 2 2K k= , Case iii) holds at a kink and no straightforward expression of *1 2C K∂ ∂
 
exists. 
where ( ) 1 20 02 1 2 2 1 2 2( )r Ck A C W I W C Pβ ρ α ρ   = − + + − − − +     
4) Analysis of 2P  
When 2 2P p> , Case i) holds and *1 1rC C= , hence *1 2 0C P∂ ∂ < ; 
When 2 2P p< , Case ii) holds and *1 1dC C= , hence *1 2 0C P∂ ∂ = ; 
When 2 2P p= , Case iii) holds at a kink and no straightforward expression of *1 2C P∂ ∂
 
exists. 
where ( ) 1 20 02 1 2 2 2 2 1 2( )C rp A C C K W I W Kβρ ρ α = − + − + + −    
5) Analysis of 1W   
When 01 2 2 2( ) rW V C W I> − + + , Case i) holds and *1 1rC C= , hence *1 1 0C W∂ ∂ = ; 
When 01 2 2 2( ) rW V C W I< − + + , Case ii) holds and *1 1dC C= , hence *1 1 0C W∂ ∂ > ; 
When 01 2 2 2( ) rW V C W I= − + + , Case iii) holds at a kink and no straightforward 
expression of *1 1C W∂ ∂
 
exists. 
3.6 Policy Implications 
In this section, we discuss the policy implications we have learned from both the basic 
and extended models. We begin with the basic model, which represents Type I producers. As 
shown in the previous sensitivity analysis of the basic model, as the contracted selling price 1P  
decreases, the current plant’s repowering threshold *1C  also decreases. This implies that 
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reducing the contracted price to the current plant expedites repowering via the reduction of the 
repowering threshold.  
In addition, it is also shown that a higher level of up-front repowering cost 2I
 
delays 
repowering. Therefore, an initial subsidy provided by the government to reduce upfront 
investment cost of the repowering plant can also be viewed as a policy tool to quicken 
repowering.  
Furthermore, we recall that as the installed repowering capacity 2K
 
increases, the 
repowering threshold decrease. Hence, a larger repowering capacity can encourage quicker 
repowering. However, the larger repowering capacity also reduces the repowered plant’s exit 
threshold, which causes an earlier exit of the repowered plant. This implies that there is a 
warning on any subsidy to encourage a larger capacity for the repowered plants. i.e., we need 
to strike a balance between faster repowering vs. longer repowered plant life 
We now proceed to address policy implications on the extended model, which 
represents the Types II and III producers. We recall that, in Case i) when 
0
2 2 2 1( ) rV C W I W− − > − , repowering when the O&M cost hits 1rC  is more valuable than waiting 
and exiting at 1dC . On the other hand, in Case ii) when 02 2 2 1( ) rV C W I W− − < − , exiting when 
the O&M cost hits 1
dC  is more valuable than waiting and repowering at 1rC . This implies the 
necessity and importance of regulatory policies on repowering. That is, if the government 
provides an appropriate incentive in relation to repowering, more producers will upgrade the 
current aging plants. Examples of such incentives include reducing current contracted price, 
reducing the upfront repowering investment cost, as well as increasing the contracted selling 
price for the repowered plant. 
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This also indicates that the lack of relevant regulatory policies might have caused the 
current “slow repowering” situation observed in U.S wind power industry, for example. 
According to Wiser (2007), one of the biggest barriers to repowering in California is that 
current aged turbine owners’ lack economic interest in repowering for the reason that “existing 
projects are already profitable under standard offer contracts and many presumably more 
profitable than if repowered.” Our findings based on the mathematical models in this paper 
corroborate such an observation. 
3.7 Numerical Example 
In this section, we numerically illustrate the key features of the basic and extended 
models. The hypothetical parameters’ values we adapted in this section are calibrated from 
realistic data of U.S. Energy Information Administration’s relevant report (EIA, 2010b) as well 
as others (e.g., Kjarland, 2007, Takashima et al., 2007). 
This section is organized as follows: we first provide a numerical example of the 
optimal decision making for Type I producers, followed by another example for Type II/III 
producers. Then we numerically demonstrate the significant policy implications we derived 
from the extended model’s sensitivity analysis results.  
For the sake of concreteness, let us assume that we have a wind farm. Also, for 
simplicity we assume that the repowered plant has same parameters as the current one except 
the named capacity and investment cost. For the current plant, the annual production rate = 
8760 MWh. For the repowered plant, we assume the annual production rate increases to 
1.5*8760=13140 MWh. The partial decommissioning cost of the current plant is assumed to 
be $100,000. The complete list of parameter values are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 3.1 Parameters and corresponding values 
 Current plant  Repowered plant 
Contracted electricity selling price  
(including tax credit benefit) 
48 $/MWh 48 $/MWh 
Nameplate capacity 3 MW 4.5 MW 
Capacity factor 33.33% 33.33% 
Investment cost  1,000,000 $ 1,500,000 $ 
Partial decommissioning fee Wr 100,000 $ N/A 
Exit fee W N/A 300,000 $ 
Annual discount rate ρ 0.05  0.05 
Annualized growth rate of O&M cost  0.04 0.04 
Annualized volatility of O&M cost  0.10 0.10 
Initial O&M cost  25 $/MWh 25 $/MWh 
 
By applying the parameter values, numerical results can be computed from the basic 
model solution as shown the in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2 Numerical results of the basic model 
1β  1.2170 
1A  452,330 
*
2C  55.1220
 
 
*
2T
 
22.5907 
3β
 
1.2170 
3A
 
310,650 
*
1C
 
48.0692 
*
1T
 
18.6790 
 
The numerical results shows that the current plant will be partially decommissioned 
and repowered when its O&M cost hits 48.0692 $/MWh, and its expected operating life is 
18.6790 years; The repowered plant will retire when its O&M cost hits 55.1220 $/MWh, and 
its expected operating life is 22.5907 years. 
Now we move to consider a Type II/III producer who also has the option to exit without 
repowering. For this extended case, we further assume the exit fee of current plant 1W = 
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$300,000, and the repowering and exit thresholds are computed as follows (each if considered 
individually): 
Table 3.3 Numerical results of the extended model 
3
rA  310,650 
1
rC  48.0692 
3
dA
 
300,800 
1
dC
 
55.7623 
*
1C
 
48.0692 
*
1T
 
18.6790 
 
In this example, 1 1
r dC C< , hence the optimal solution is to repower when O&M cost 
hits 1
rC . Figure 3.3 illustrates the two alternatives we considered. 
 
Figure 3.3 Comparison of project values in the extended model 
 
Now we demonstrate the results of extended model sensitivity analysis by changing 
one critical parameter’s value while keeping the others same as stated before to examine its 
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impact on the whole model and crosscheck with the analytical results. The following tables 
summarize our results. We note that the parameters we tested (one at a time) are the up-front 
repowering investment cost 2I , repowering selling price 2P , repowering capacity 2K
 
and 
current selling price 1P .   
Table 3.4 Numerical results of sensitivity analysis 
 Change the value of 2I   Change the value of 2P  
 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 3,000,000 32 40 48 56 
3
rA  315,330 310,650 306,330 298,610 293,960 300,750 310,650 324,530 
1
rC  44.8680 48.0692 51.2704 57.6728 61.9997 55.8073 48.0692 39.2960 
3
dA  300,800 300,800 300,800 300,800 300,800 300,800 300,800 300,800 
1
dC  55.7623 55.7623 55.7623 55.7623 55.7623 55.7623 55.7623 55.7623 
*
1T
 
16.7100 18.6790 20.5211 22.9206 22.9206 22.9206 18.6790 12.9213 
*
2T
 
22.5907 22.5907 22.5907 N/A N/A N/A 22.5907 26.9000 
 
Table 3.4 summarizes the numerical results of changing 2I
 
and 2P
 
respectively. As 2I
 
increases from $1,000,000 to $3,000,000, the repowering threshold increases from 44.8680 to 
57.6728 ($/MWh), while the exit threshold stays at 55.7623 ($/MWh). The optimal decision 
thus switched from repowering to exiting with the expected life of the current plant increasing, 
which supports our sensitivity analysis results for the extended model. Similar observation can 
be made on 2P , too. As 2P
 
increases, the repowering threshold decreases and the exit threshold 
stays the same. Hence, the optimal decision will switch from exit to repowering. The increase 
in 2P  also makes the current plant’s expected life shorter and the repowered plant’s expected 
life longer. In addition, we find it interesting that the change in the repowering threshold 
becomes steeper as the selling price of the repowered plant increases. 
Table 3.5 summarizes the numerical results of changing 2K
 
and 1P
 
respectively. As 2K  
increases, the repowering threshold decreases and exit threshold stays the same. As 1P
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increases, both repowering and exit thresholds increase, and so does the current plant’s 
expected life. It is easy to see that these observations match the sensitivity analysis results. 
Table 3.4 Numerical results of sensitivity analysis (cont’d) 
 Change the value of 2K   Change the value of 1P  
 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 32 40 48 56 
3
rA  296,900 303,330 310,650 319,080 343,810 324,890 310,650 299,320 
1
rC  59.2225 53.6508 48.0692 42.4850 30.1220 39.0956 48.0692 57.0428 
3
dA  300,800 300,800 300,800 300,800 327,250 312,470 300,800 291,220 
1
dC  55.7623 55.7623 55.7623 55.7623 37.8151 46.7887 55.7623 64.7359 
*
1T
 
22.9206 21.8177 18.6790 15.1507 5.3252 12.7753 18.6790 23.5693 
*
2T
 
N/A 22.9206 22.5907 22.4243 22.5907 22.5907 22.5907 22.5907 
 
3.8 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we modeled and analyzed how an economically rational renewable 
power producer makes decisions regarding repowering and/or exit of its current plant when the 
O&M cost is modeled as a GBM process. Based on producers’ different sizes, generation 
resources, and market powers, we classify our study subject of such producers into Types I, II, 
and III. For a single producer of each type, we obtained the threshold levels of the O&M cost 
for the current plant’s repowering/exit decisions as well as the repowered plant’s exit decision.  
Based on the optimal decisions, we conducted extensive sensitivity analyses with 
respect to various critical parameters with significant policy implications. In the basic model, 
a higher level of the repowered plant’s contracted selling price expedites repowering while a 
higher level of the current plant’s contracted selling price discourages early repowering. Also, 
a larger capacity of the current plant delays repowering and lengthens the life of the current 
plant. On the other hand, a larger capacity of the repowered plant expedites repowering, but 
shortens the life of the repowered plant.  
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In the extended model, we found that the optimal decision between exit vs. repower 
depends on the profitability of the repowering project as well as the cost of terminating the 
current plant, and we found corroborating evidence to the claim that the current producers’ 
lack of economic interest in repowering in the case of wind power via mathematical models 
and sensitivity analysis.  
This work can serve as a basis for studying the repowering policy for renewable power 
producers. So far, our analysis has emphasized the straightforward economic components of 
contracted price, upfront investment cost, and exit fee. For future studies, it is highly desirable 
to link our kind of investigation to more sophisticated programs of incentives and fees such as 
Production Tax Credit (PTC), Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS’s). Based on our findings 
thus far, it may be plausible that it is the environmental policies and programs that need 
stewardship perhaps more than the environment itself. 
Moreover, it may also be worthwhile to relax some of our simplifying assumptions, 
and examine the ramifications of such relaxations. For example, instead of the power 
contracted selling price, one can consider market based selling price, which can be modeled as 
a separate GBM process, which will strongly expand the applicability of our approach. 
Furthermore, rigorous stochastic optimal control models can be utilized for policy and program 
design with explicit feedback control that would adapt to the positive/negative changes in the 
policy and program circumstances.
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CHAPTER 4 . REPOWERING UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY 
 
In this chapter we formulate a two-dimensional repowering model taking into 
consideration the exogenous policy uncertainty on top of the O&M cost using a real options 
approach. Specifically we study the typical PTC scheme and its uncertainty is modeled with 
Poisson processes and the O&M cost is formulated as a GBM process, as we did in previous 
two chapters. By doing so we aim to explore and understand the combined effect of policy 
uncertainty and stochastic O&M cost on the repowering decision making of renewable power 
producers.  
Unlike O&M cost which evolves continuously as the plant operates, external 
uncertainties, such as technological progression and policy, are not likely to be well captured 
by a diffusion process; it is more likely to be a Poisson jump (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). For 
example, the arrival of a new technology is uncertain and can be modeled as a Poisson arrival 
process. Once it becomes available, the initial investment cost of repowering will be significant 
reduced into a lower level. Government policies and subsidies, on the other hand, usually act 
in a more complicated way due to their frequent expiration-renewal cycle. The switches 
between policy in effect and not can also be formulated as Poisson jump processes. 
In the rest of this section, we start with a comprehensive review of the related literature 
in investment study under the PTC uncertainty as well as methodologies. We then present a 
specific PTC renewal model where we assume the PTC is currently not in effect but will be 
renewed. This is followed by an expiration model where the PTC is currently in effect but will 
expire in the future. We then proceed to present a generalized model where the random PTC 
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switches between two regimes (i.e., in effect or not). For each of the three models the optimal 
repowering policy will be obtained in terms of two threshold values.   
4.1 Literature Review 
One early study on investment decision and technology adoption is Balcer and 
Lippman (1984), in which firms anticipate a sequence of innovations of uncertain profitability 
and revise their expectations about the occurrence of the next innovation as time passes since 
the last innovation. It shows that it is optimal for a firm to adopt the current best technology if 
its technological lag exceeds a certain threshold.  
The real options approach has been adopted widely to study the effects of various 
uncertainties on capital investment. For stochastic future technology advancement, works have 
been done under the assumption that the arrival of new technology as a Poisson process 
(Huisman and Kort, 2004). The state of technological progress has also been modelled as a 
GBM process so that the innovation arrives when the state rises to an upper boundary 
(Grenadier and Weiss, 1997). In Farzin et al. (1998), the decision maker faces uncertainties 
about not only the arrival speed, but also the degree of improvements of technologies. 
The policy uncertainty modeling is to some extent similar to the one of technology. 
Their effects can both be reflected in terms of initial investment and revenue stream of a project 
and will both affect the decision maker’s investment timing and scale.  However, subsequent 
technological improvements would often not affect the values of projects that already exist, 
while a policy scheme like the PTC, is usually subject to renewal and expiration and will have 
long-term effect across the project’s life span.  
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One of the earliest work to our knowledge that uses a real-options approach to model 
the investment behaviors under policy uncertainty is Hassett and Metcalf (1999), where the 
random discrete jump of investment tax credit is modeled in Poisson processes. Further 
applications have also been developed in Agliardi (2001), which assumes that investment is 
partially reversible and the investment tax incentive changes randomly so that the price of 
capital follows a combined Brownian and Poisson process. It shows that tax policy uncertainty 
delays investment and speeds up disinvestment. Lately there are also a few applications in 
power systems research that use similar approaches to investigate the optimal timing of power 
plant investment (see Himpler and Madlener (2011), Min et al. (2012), Takashima et al. (2007), 
and Fleten et al. (2007)). Batista et al. (2011) uses a real options approach to compute the 
incremental payoff from the sale of Certified Emission Reductions (CER) for Brazil’s 
renewable power projects where the CER price is considered to be stochastic over time. 
4.2 Repowering Under Policy Renewal Possibility  
We consider the case in which the is currently not in effect and is perceived to have a 
probability of 1dtλ  to be renewed in the next time interval of dt . The value of 1λ  represents 
the number of renewals per unit time (e.g., per year) and we use the term renewal for the future 
(not the present or past). The PTC level is s  ($/MWh) and we do not consider expiration once 
it is renewed in this section; this will be addressed in the generalized model later.  
The following critical assumptions are made to enable us to focus on the study of 
economically rational repowering decisions and to maintain mathematical derivations 
tractable. We note that the subscript 1i =  designates the current plant while 2i =  designates 
the repowered plant. 
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Assumption 1: For both current and repowering plant, the electricity generated is sold 
at a fixed selling price of iP  ($/MWh) via long term power purchase agreements (PPAs).  
Assumption 2: In making the repowering decision, the decision maker will rely on the 
fixed (expected) annual production quantity, iK  (MWh), which equals to the nameplate 
capacity times annual capacity factor and number of hours in a year (see e.g., [8]). 
Assumption 3: For both plants, the operation and maintenance cost (O&M cost; 
$/MWh) at any time point, iC , follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) processes. 
Specifically, 
i ii C i C i
dC C dt C dzα σ= +                                                                                                 
where 
iC
α  is the instantaneous growth rate of the O&M cost (% per year), 
iC
σ  is the 
instantaneous volatility of iC  (% per square root of year), and dz  is the increment of a standard 
Wiener process z  ( tdz dtε=  where ~ (0,1)t Nε ).  
We note that this assumption, along with the Possion assumption of PTC 
renewal/expiration, are two of the most important features that distinguish this work from 
others in close areas. Such assumptions allows us a much tractable analysis on the repowering 
decisions under cost and policy uncertainties. The empirical justification of these two 
assumption will be presented in Chapter 5. 
Assumption 4: Any repowering plant built and starts operation when the PTC is in 
effect is eligible for the tax benefit of its entire operating life. The power producer will also 
have a sufficient level of tax liability to take full advantage of the PTC.  
Assumption 5: We assume that the decision maker is currently considering the existing 
plant’s repowering only once. That is, the decision maker is not currently considering any 
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subsequent repowering decisions. The reason is that, given the typical plant’s physical life of 
about 20 years, it may be impractical to plan what would happen during 20 to 40 years from 
now. We also note that the degenerate repowering decision of exiting the market is not 
considered. 
Under these assumptions, our problem can be formulated as a two-stage optimal 
stopping problem under two types of uncertainty: the PTC renewal and O&M cost. To derive 
the optimal repowering strategy, we start backwardly from the repowered plant and first obtain 
the optimal time to terminate it without repowering again as stated in Assumption 5, which is 
analogous to the optimal stopping problem in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).  
Given 02C  as the initial cost when the repowered plant starts to operate (the superscript 
0 designates the initial point), we denote the value of the repowered plant when it is eligible 
for the PTC as 2HV  and that when it is ineligible for the PTC as 2LV  (the superscript H/L 
denotes that the PTC is in effect or not). Namely, 
( ) ( ) ( )1 20 0 02 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( )H H CV C A C C K P s Kβ ρ α ρ= − − + +                                           (4.1)                                                
( ) ( )1 20 0 02 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( )L L CV C A C C K P Kβ ρ α ρ= − − +                                                     (4.2)                                                
where  
( )2 2 2 2 2 222 2 2 21 1 2 1 2 2 1C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − + >                                          (4.3)                                                 
( )( )( )
( )
22 2 2 1
2
1 21
CH
P s K W
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
+ + −
=
−
                                                                   (4.4)                                        
( ) ( )
( )
22 2 2 1
2
1 21
CL
P K W
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
+ −
=
−
                                                                             (4.5)                                                                 
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( ) ( ) 12
2
1 1
1 2
H
H
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                                                      (4.6)                                                                   
( ) ( ) 12
2
1 1
1 2
L
L
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                                                       (4.7)                                                                    
We note that 2
HC  and 2LC  are the threshold value of O&M cost at which the repowered 
plant will be terminated, ρ  is the annualized discount factor, and 2W  is the exit fee to be paid 
upon termination. 
We then move to the current stage where the aging plant is still operating and the 
producer holds the option to repower it. In this case, the producer has two possible options for 
repowering: to wait and repower when the PTC arrives (Case 1.1), or to repower even if the 
PTC has not been renewed yet (Case 1.2). We first denote the O&M cost threshold at which 
the producer will repower with the presence of the PTC as *11C . The first subscript represents 
the current plant and the second represents Case 1.1. Since the producer perceives that the PTC 
will not expire once it gets renewed, *11C  can be solved at which the payoff of the repowering 
project equals to the value of the repowered plant minus associated cost terms, i.e.,  
0
2 2 2( )H rV C W Iχ = − − , where rW  is the partial decommissioning cost and 2I  is the upfront 
investment cost of the repowered plant. For simplicity we denote the current project value 
considering both the current and repowered plants after the PTC turns on as 1 1( )CΦ  and it can 
be expressed as   
3
1
*1 1
3 1 1 1 1 11
1 1
*
1 11
if (0, )
( )
if [ , )
C
C KA C PK C C
C
C C
β ρ
ρ α
χ

− + ∈
−Φ = 
 ∈ ∞
                                             (4.8)                                                      
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where  
( )1 1 1 1 1 122 2 2 23 1 2 1 2 2C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − +                                                 (4.9)                                                   
[ ]( )
( )
11 1 3*
11
3 11
CPKC
K
ρ χ ρ α β
β
− −
=
−
                                                                              (4.10)                         
( ) ( ) 31
1
3 1
*
3 11C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                                                      (4.11)                                                                        
Given the fact that the PTC is currently not renewed yet and may not be renewed soon, 
there exists another threshold *12C  (the second subscript represents case 1.2) such that 
* *
12 11C C>  and the producer will repower anyway even if the PTC has not arrived yet when the 
O&M cost hits for *12C . This is also an optimal stopping problem, in which stopping means to 
repower without the PTC. When *1 12C C≥ , the value of the current plant 12V  equals to 
0
2 2 2( )L rV C W Iω = − − . 
In the continuation region (i.e., *1 12C C< ) where to wait is the optimal strategy, the 
value of the producer when the PTC is yet to be in effect denoted by 11 1( )V C  must satisfy the 
following Bellman equation: 
( ) [ ]11 1 1 1 111 EV P C K dVdtρ = − +                                                                              (4.12)                                                                       
By using Ito’s lemma and retaining leading terms, 11dV  can be expanded as 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1
2
2 211 11
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 112
1 1
11
2C C C
V VdV dt C dt C dz C dt dt V
C C
λ α σ σ λ ∂ ∂= − + + + Φ − ∂ ∂ 
     (4.13)               
Using (4.13) in (4.12) and letting dt  go to zero gives 
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( ) ( )
1 1
2
2 211 11
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 12
1 1
1 0
2 C C
V VC C V P C K
C C
σ α ρ λ λ∂ ∂+ − + + − + Φ =
∂ ∂                          (4.14) 
Using the two possible expressions for 1 1( )CΦ , the solution of 11 1( )V C  above is given 
by 
5 3
1
5 6
1
*1 1
1 1 3 1 1 1 1 11
* *1 1 1 1 1
2 1 3 1 1 11 1211 1
1 1
*
1 12
if (0, )
if [ , )( )
if [ , )
C
C
C KC A C PK C C
C K PKC C C C CV C
C C
β β
β β
δ ρ
ρ α
λ χδ δ
ρ λ α ρ λ
ω

+ − + ∈
−

 + + − + ∈=  + − +


∈ ∞
  
             (4.15)               
where 5β ( 6β ) is the positive (negative) root of the characteristic quadratic equation as 
( ) ( )1 1 12 2 2 11 2 1 2 0C C Cσ β α σ β ρ λ+ − − + =                                                              (4.16)  
The following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of 11 1( )V C
 
must satisfy 
at *1 11C C= ,  
( ) ( ) ( )5 5 6
1
*
* * * 11 1 1 1
1 11 2 11 3 11
C
C K PKC C C
β β β λχδ χ δ δ
ρ λ α ρ λ
+
+ = + − +
+ − +
                        
(4.17.1)
 
( ) ( ) ( )5 5 6
1
1 1 1
* * * 1
1 5 11 2 5 11 3 6 11
C
KC C C
β β βδ β δ β δ β
ρ λ α
− − −
= + −
+ −
                                
(4.17.2) 
The following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of 11 1( )V C
 
must satisfy 
at *1 12C C= ,  
( ) ( )5 6
1
*
* * 12 1 1 1
2 12 3 12
C
C K PKC C
β β λχδ δ ω
ρ λ α ρ λ
+
+ − + =
+ − +
                                           
(4.18.1) 
( ) ( )5 6
1
1 1
* * 1
2 5 12 3 6 12 0
C
KC C
β βδ β δ β
ρ λ α
− −
+ − =
+ −
                                                   
(4.18.2) 
70 
 
1δ , 2δ , 3δ  and *12C  can be obtained by simultaneously solving the four value-matching 
and smooth-pasting conditions at *11C  and *12C . It turns out that there is no closed-form solution 
for *12C  and it is implicitly determined by the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )6
1
*
* 12 1 1 1 1
5 6 3 12 5 5
1 1
1 0
C
C K PKC
β λ χβ β δ β β ω
ρ λ α ρ λ
 +
− − − + − = 
+ − + 
                     (4.19)                            
Coefficient 1δ , 2δ  and 3δ  are equal to: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
6
1
5
1
1
*
1 3 6 11 1
1 2 1
*
1 5 11
C
C
C K
C
β
β
ρ λ α δ β
δ δ
ρ λ α β
−
−
+ − −
= +
+ −
                                                             (4.20)                                                                    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
6
5
*
6 1 3 12 1 1 1 1
2
*
5 1 12
1
1
C PK
C
β
β
β ρ λ δ λ χ ρ λ ω
δ
β ρ λ
− + + + − +
=
− +
                                       (4.21)                                          
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
61 1
1 1
13 5 1 3 5 1 *
3 11 1
1 1 5 6 3
1 1C C
C C
C K
ββ β ρ λ ρ α β β ρ ρ λ αδ
ρ λ α ρ λ β β β ρ α
− +− + − − − + −
=
+ − + − −
           (4.22)                   
The following proposition proves the existence and uniqueness of the optimal 
repowering strategy represented by the two thresholds of * *11 12( , )C C . 
Proposition 4.1   There exists a unique * *12 11( , )C C∈ ∞  such that it satisfies (4.19). 
Proof: To show the existence and uniqueness of *12C , we first define a new function Θ  
such that ( ) ( ) ( )6
1
1 1
1 5 6 3 1 5( ) 1
C
C KC C ββ β δ β
ρ λ αΘ = − − − + − , and 
*
12C  is the solution of 
1 1
1 5( )
PKC λχβ ω
ρ λ
 +Θ = − + 
. Taking the first order derivative of 1C  gives 
( ) ( ) ( )6
1
11 1
6 5 6 3 1 5
1
( ) 1
C
C KC
C
ββ β β δ β
ρ λ α
−∂Θ
= − − −
∂ + − .  Given 5 1β >  and 6 0β < , it is easy to 
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see 1
1
( ) 0C
C
∂Θ
<
∂
. By rearranging and simplifying (4.17.1) and (4.17.2) we also have *11C  
satisfies 1 11 5( )
PKC λχβ χ
ρ λ
 +Θ = − + 
. Because the payoff of the repowering project with PTC 
active is higher than when there is no PTC, i.e., χ ω> , we have 
1 1 1 1 1 1
5 5 5 0
PK PK PKλχ λχ ρχβ ω β χ β
ρ λ ρ λ ρ λ
   + + −
− > − = >   + + +   
. Combining this with the 
negative slope of 1( )CΘ  leads * *12 11C C> .   
Proposition 4.1 actually tells us that to repower without PTC always has its value no 
matter how high the probability of PTC being renewed soon is. In other words, the producer 
will not wait for PTC forever; he will repower anyway if PTC is not available when the O&M 
cost hits *12C .      
The following proposition states the sign of the coefficients in the current project’s 
value function. 
Proposition 4.2   The coefficients 1 2,δ δ , and 3δ  have the following signs: 1 0δ < , 
2 0δ > , and 3 0δ > . 
Proof: The sign of 2δ  follows immediately from (4.21). The necessary and sufficient 
condition of 3 0δ >
 
is that the numerator of (4.22)’s fraction part to be positive, i.e.,  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 13 5 3 51 1 0C Cβ β ρ λ ρ α β β ρ ρ λ α− + − − − + − >                                    (4.23) 
We know that 5 3β β≥ , where the equality sign only holds for 1Cσ → ∞  for which we 
have 5 3 1β β= = . Rewrite 5 3β ξβ=  and substitute in the left-hand side of (4.23): 
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( )( )( ) ( ) ( )1 13 3 3 3( ) 1 1C Cϕ ξ β ξβ ρ λ ρ α ξ β β ρ ρ λ α= − + − − − + −  
Then (1) 0ϕ =  and ( ) ( )13 3 1 0C Cϕ ξ β ρ β α λ ρ ρ α∂ ∂ = − + − > , implying 0ϕ >  for 
any 1ξ > , which leads to (4.23).  
For the sign of 1δ , we first define the following two functions: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )
6
5
6 2 1 1 1
1
5 1
1( ) 0
1
C PK
Y C
C
β
β
β ρ λ γ λχ ρ λ ω
β ρ λ
− + + + − +
= >
− +
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
6
1
5
1
1
2 6 1 1
1 1
5 1
( ) 0C
C
C K
Z C
C
β
β
ρ λ α γ β
ρ λ α β
−
−
+ − −
= <
+ −
 
Thus * *3 12 11( ) ( )Y C Z Cδ = + . Let *1 12C C= , we have * *12 12( ) ( ) 0Y C Z C+ =  from (4.19). 
Take the first derivative of 1( )Z C  we have 
( ) ( )5 56
1
1 1 51 1 1
2 6 6 5 1 1
1 5 5
1( ) ( )
C
KZ C C CC C
C
β β
β βγ β β β ψβ ρ λ α β
− −
−
 
−∂
= − − = ∂ + −  
 
*
121
1
1
( )
C C
Z C
C =
∂
∂  can be verified to be positive since 1( ) 0Cψ >  from (4.19). Combining 
with 1 1( ) 0C Cψ∂ ∂ <  yields 1 1( ) 0Z C C∂ ∂ >  for any * *1 11 12[ , ]C C C∈ , which, eventually leads 
to  * * * *1 12 11 12 12( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0Y C Z C Y C Z Cδ = + < + < .   
We notice that in (4.15) when *1 11C C< , the first term 51 1C βδ  actually consists of two 
parts. The first part, ( ) 51 2 1C βδ δ− , is a negative correction term due to the fact that PTC has 
not been renewed yet; the second part, 52 1C
βδ  is the value of the option to repower without the 
PTC. It turns out the correction factor always dominates the option value and thus 1 0δ < . 
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So far we solved the producer’s repowering problem by considering the two possible 
moves when the PTC is not yet renewed. We establish the following decision making rule: 
Consider the repowering problem when the PTC has not yet renewed, the producer will 
adopt the following strategy: (1) wait and repower when the current plant’s O&M cost hits *11C  
if the PTC has been renewed by then; (2) if the PTC is not available at *11C , keep waiting and 
repower when it gets renewed; If the PTC is still not available when the current plant’s O&M 
cost hits *12C , repower anyway. 
4.3 Repowering Under Policy Expiration Possibility  
In this section we consider an opposite case where the PTC is currently in effect but 
has a probability of 0dtλ  to be permanently removed in the next time interval of dt , where 0λ  
represents the number of expirations per unit time. Under this circumstance there are also two 
possible repowering moves for the producer: to repower after the PTC expires or before. 
Similar to the previous model, the repowering threshold *13C  and corresponding value function 
after the PTC permanently expires can be derived as follows 
3
1
*1 1
5 1 1 1 1 13
2 1
*
1 13
if (0, )
( )
if [ , )
C
C KA C PK C C
C
C C
β ρ
ρ α
ω

− + ∈
−Φ = 
 ∈ ∞
                                          (4.24)                                                 
[ ]( )
( )
11 1 3*
13
3 11
CPKC
K
ρ ω ρ α β
β
− −
=
−
                                                                             (4.25)                                                                
( ) ( ) 31
1
5 1
*
3 13C
KA
C
βρ α β −
==
−
                                                                                   (4.26)                                                                      
Given the fact that the PTC is still in effect for now, there exists another threshold *14C  
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( * *14 13C C< ) such that the producer will repower before the PTC expires, which gives payoff χ
. The value function of the producer in *14(0, )C  must satisfy the following ODE 
( ) ( )
1 1
2
2 212 12
1 1 0 12 1 1 1 0 22
1 1
1 0
2 C C
V VC C V P C K
C C
σ α ρ λ λ∂ ∂+ − + + − + Φ =
∂ ∂                         (4.27)                                 
Using the first expression in (21), the whole solution of 12 1( )V C  is given by  
7 3
1
*1 1
4 1 5 1 1 1 1 14
12 1
*
1 14
if (0, )
( )
if [ , )
C
C KC A C PK C C
V C
C C
β βδ ρ
ρ α
χ

+ − + ∈
−= 
 ∈ ∞
                             (4.28)                                       
where 7β  is the positive root of the characteristic quadratic equation as 
( ) ( )1 1 12 2 2 01 2 1 2 0C C Cσ β α σ β ρ λ+ − − + =                                                            (4.29)                                                                       
*
14C  and 4δ  can be solved by applying boundary conditions between 12 1( )V C  and the 
repowering payoff χ , which leads to the following 
( ) ( ) ( )3
1
*
* 14 1 1 1
7 3 5 14 7 7 71 0
C
C K PKA C
ββ β β β β χ
ρ α ρ
− − − + − =
−
                                     (4.30)                                             
( ) ( )3 7
1
*
* *14 1
4 5 14 1 1 14
C
C KA C PK C
β βδ χ ρ
ρ α
−
 
= − + − 
−  
                                                  (4.31)                                                          
The following proposition states the existence and uniqueness of the optimal 
repowering policy as well as the sign of the coefficient in the producer’s value function. 
Proposition 4.3   There exists a unique * *14 13(0, )C C∈  such that it satisfies (4.30). The 
coefficient 4 0δ > . 
This proposition can be proved using the slope negativity of (4.30) in *14(0, )C . We 
establish the following decision making rule for this PTC expiration case: 
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Consider the repowering problem when the PTC is in effect but will expire in the future, 
the producer will adopt the following strategy: (1) wait until the O&M cost hits *14C  and 
repower if the PTC is still in effect by then; (2) if the PTC has expired, keep waiting till the 
O&M cost hits *13C  and repower. 
In this section, we generalize the previous two models by accounting simultaneously 
the cases of the PTC being in effect and not. 
We assume the uncertainty PTC follows a Poisson process randomly switching 
between two regimes: in effect at a fixed level s  or zero. Starting with a state when it is not in 
effect, the probability for it to be renewed in the next short interval of time dt  is 1dtλ . When 
it is in effect, the corresponding probability for it to expire is 0dtλ . 
To value the repowering option, we start from the repowered plant as before. The value 
function of the repowered plant as well as the exit threshold values with/without the PTC are 
the same as in (4.1) through (4.7). 
We then move to the current stage where the producer has the option to repower the 
current plant. Based on the solution structures of the two previous cases we suggest that there 
exist two threshold values 1 1( , )C C  for the optimal repowering policy. When the current plant’s 
O&M cost is in the region 1(0, )C , no repowering project will be undertaken irrespective of 
whether the PTC is in effect. Over an interval 1 1( , )C C , the producer will repower only if the 
credit is in effect and will still wait if not. Once the O&M cost hits the upper threshold 1C , the 
producer will repower anyway regardless the PTC is in effect or not. 
To determine the thresholds 1C  and 1C , we first denote the value function when the 
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PTC is in effect and not as 11 1( )V C  and 01 1( )V C  respectively. For each of these three regions, 
we obtain expressions for these, as well as the conditions they must satisfy at the thresholds. 
Over the region 1( , )C ∞ , the producer will always repower the current plant, so we have  
1
1 1( )V C χ=                                                                                                              (4.32)                                        
0
1 1( )V C ω=                                                                                                              (4.33)                                             
where the expressions of χ  and ω  are as the same as before. 
Then we move to the region 1 1( , )C C , where the producer will repower only if the PTC 
is in effect. Because repowering will be undertaken when the PTC is in effect,  11 1( )V C  is given 
by (29) as above. For 01 1( )V C , the following ODE can be obtained in the same fashion as in 
Section 2. 
( ) ( )
1 1
2 0 0
2 2 01 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
1 1
1 0
2 C C
V VC C V P C K
C C
σ α ρ λ λ χ∂ ∂+ − + + − + =
∂ ∂                            (4.34)                            
The solution to (4.34) consists of a general solution of the homogeneous part and a 
particular solution to the whole equation, which is 
5 6
1
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 1
1 1
( )
C
C K PKV C B C B Cβ β λ χ
ρ λ α ρ λ
+
= + − +
+ − +
                                               (4.35)                                                    
Finally we address the region 1(0, )C . In this region, the producer waits in both policy 
regimes, and each regime can switch to the other in the next short interval of time. Following 
the same steps we have a pair of differential equations: 
( ) ( )
1 1
2 0 0
2 2 0 1 01 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12
1 1
1 0
2 C C
V VC C V P C K V V
C C
σ α ρ λ∂ ∂+ − + − + − =
∂ ∂                        (4.36)                                  
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( ) ( )
1 1
2 1 1
2 2 1 0 11 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 12
1 1
1 0
2 C C
V VC C V P C K V V
C C
σ α ρ λ∂ ∂+ − + − + − =
∂ ∂                         (4.37)                                
To solve the two ODE’s, we manipulate (4.36) and (4.37) by multiplying (4.36) by 
11 λ  plus (4.37) multiplied by 01 λ , 
( )
1 1
2 0 2 1 0 1
2 21 1 1 1
1 12 2
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
2
1 1 1 1 0
C C
V V V VC C
C C C C
V V P C K
σ αλ λ λ λ
ρ λ λ λ λ
   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + +   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
   
− + + + − =   
   
                                     (4.38)               
We then subtract (4.36) from (3.37) 
( ) ( )
1 1
2 1 2 0 1 0
2 2 1 01 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 12 2
1 1 1 1
1 0
2 C C
V V V VC C V V
C C C C
σ α ρ λ λ   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− + − − + + − =   ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   
          (4.39)                      
Define the following two new functions 
0 1
1 1 1 1 0
aV V Vλ λ= +  , 1 01 1 1bV V V= −  
Then (4.38) and (4.39) can be simplified as 
( )
1 1
2
2 21 1
1 1 1 1 1 12
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0
2
a a
a
C C
V VC C V P C K
C C
σ α ρ λ λ
 ∂ ∂
+ − + + − = ∂ ∂  
                              (4.40)                                       
( )
1 1
2
2 21 1
1 1 0 1 12
1 1
1 0
2
b b
b
C C
V VC C V
C C
σ α ρ λ λ∂ ∂+ − + + =
∂ ∂                                                    (4.41)                                                        
Each of these two equation yields a solution as follows, 
3
1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 0
1 1( )a a
C
PK C KV C D C β λ λ ρ ρ α
  
= + + −   
−  
                                                       (4.42)                                                                
9
1 1 1( )b bV C D C β=                                                                                                       (4.43)                                                                           
where 9β  is the positive root of  
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( ) ( )1 1 12 2 2 0 11 2 1 2 0C C Cσ β α σ β ρ λ λ+ − − + + =                                                      (4.44)                                                          
Therefore, the expressions of 11 1( )V C  and 01 1( )V C  in this region can be written as 
3 9
1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1
1 01
1 1
0 1
1 1
( )
a b
C
PK C KD C D C
V C
β βλ λ λλ λ ρ ρ α
λ λ
   
+ + − +    
−    
=
+
                           (4.45)                 
3 9
1
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1
1 00
1 1
0 1
1 1
( )
a b
C
PK C KD C D C
V C
β βλ λ λλ λ ρ ρ α
λ λ
   
+ + − −    
−    
=
+
                           (4.46)               
So far we have derived the current plant’s value functions. By imposing boundary 
conditions on these functions we have the following six equations that can be used to solve for 
six unknowns: the two thresholds 1C , 1C , and the four coefficients 1B , 2B , aD  and bD .  
( )3 9
1
1 11 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0
1 1
a b
C
C KPKD C D Cβ βλ λ λ λ λ χλ λ ρ ρ α
     
+ + − + + =     
−      
            (4.47)                     
3 9
1
1 11
0 1 3 1 0 9 1
1 0
1 1 0a b
C
KD C D Cβ βλ λ β λ βλ λ ρ α
− −
  
− + + =  
−   
                                     (4.48)                                     
( )3 9
1
5 6
1
1 11 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1
1 1
1 1
a b
C
C
C KPKD C D C
C K PKB C B C
β β
β β
λ λ λ λ λλ λ ρ ρ α
λ χ
ρ λ α ρ λ
     
+ + − − +     
−      
+
= + − +
+ − +
                   (4.49)                          
( )3 9
1
5 6
1
1 11
0 1 3 1 1 9 1 0 1
1 0
1 1 1
1 5 1 2 6 1
1
1 1
a b
C
C
KD C D C
KB C B C
β β
β β
λ λ β λ β λ λλ λ ρ α
β β
ρ λ α
− −
− −
    
− + − +   
−     
= + −
+ −
                      (4.50)                             
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5 6
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1
1 1C
C K PKB C B C
β β λ χ
ω
ρ λ α ρ λ
+
+ − + =
+ − +
                                                    (4.51)                                                    
5 6
1
1 1 1
1 5 1 2 6 1
1
0
C
KB C B C
β ββ β
ρ λ α
− −
+ − =
+ −
                                                             (4.52)                                                              
Although a closed-form analytical solution is not possible for this non-linear equation 
system, it can be solved numerically using approximation algorithms such as the Newton-
Raphson method. The next section provides a numerical example of the generalized model 
solution and compares it with the two previous cases. Together they capture the main 
managerial insights of this section. 
4.4 Case Study: A Wind Farm Repowering Project 
In this section we assume that the representative producer has a wind farm that is 
currently operating. The hypothetical parameters’ values we adapted are calibrated from 
realistic data of EIA (2010) as well as others (e.g., Takashima et al. (2007) and Kjarland 
(2007)). The complete list of parameter values are shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Parameters and corresponding values 
 
We first demonstrate the key features of the first two models. Table 4.2 summarizes 
the optimal repowering policy given the perceived PTC renewal/expiration rate ranging from 
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0.00 to 0.05. It shows that in the renewal model where the PTC is not in effect yet, the producer 
will wait longer to repower given a high probability of the PTC being effective in the near 
future. In the expiration model where the PTC is currently in effect, the producer will repower 
earlier given a higher probability of expiration. 
Table 4.2 Numerical results of first two models 
 
For the generalized model, we use the Newton-Raphson method in MATLAB to find 
the approximate solution to the non-linear equation system (4.47) - (4.52). In order to converge 
to optimality with reasonable computing time, we scale down the equations by dividing the 
values of 
r
W , 2W , 2I , 1K  and 2K  by 8,760,000. This scale comes from the presumed number 
of hours in a year (8,760) multiples by 1,000, which in this case significantly reduced 
computing time. The following tables summarize the numerical solution with both 0λ  and 1λ  
ranging from 0.01 to 0.05.  
Table 4.3 indicates that 0λ  and 1λ  have opposite effects on the optimal repowering 
threshold with PTC. While 1C  decreases as the probability of expiration 0λ  increases, it 
increases as the probability of being in effect increases. However, the effect of 1λ  is much less 
significant because in this case expiration only occurs after renewal and thus has a lower impact 
on the producer’s current decision making.  Table 4.4 shows that when the PTC is currently 
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absent, an increase in 1λ  increases the repowering threshold. 0λ  has the opposite impact but is 
almost negligible.  
Table 4.3 Numerical results of the generalized model 
 
Table 4.3 Numerical results of the generalized model (cont’d) 
 
In Table 4.5 we take the difference between 1C and 1C  from Table III and IV. The 
two thresholds intend to differ more as the uncertainty in the PTC increases, indicating the 
impact of uncertainty in the decision maker’s repowering preference. 
Table 4.4 Numerical difference in the generalized model  
 
By comparing the numerical solution of the generalized model with the two special 
models, we also find that, given the same values of 0λ  and 1λ , the solution seems to always 
fall between the corresponding special solutions. That is, * * * *14 1 11 13 1 12,C C C C C C< < < < . This 
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implies that the combination of first two models might serve as a good approximation of the 
generalized repowering policy. This is important because solving the generalized system can 
be numerically challenging under certain circumstances especially when it is difficult to find 
an appropriate initial point.  
 
Figure 4.1 Current plant value functions given 0 10.04, 0.05λ λ= =  
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Figure 4.1 above presents and compares the value functions of the current plant under 
different model settings, given 0 0.04λ =  and 1 0.05λ = . The top figure demonstrates the first 
two model, where the solid line represented the scenario with renewal probability only.  
If we compare the top solid line with the bottom solid line, it shows that in *14(0, )C , the 
top line yields higher value than the bottom one, which implies that the renewal model 
overestimates the value of the current plant by ignoring the probability of the PTC expires after 
being renewed. It can also be shown that the expiration model underestimates the value of the 
current plant. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we studied the optimal timing of repowering for a representative 
renewable power producer under stochastic O&M cost and uncertain PTC. While the O&M 
cost was modeled as a GBM process, we focused on how the uncertainty in the PTC’s 
renewal/expiration affects the producer’s repowering decision making. This paper, to our 
knowledge, is the first one studying the repowering problem of the current aging renewable 
power plants considering both O&M cost and policy uncertainties. 
We first constructed two special models in which the producer perceives the PTC 
changing from being not in effect to in effect and from being in effect to not in effect. We 
solved each model analytically and obtained a corresponding two-threshold optimal 
repowering policy. We showed that when the PTC is currently not in effect, the probability of 
it being renewed will keep the producer wait longer comparing to the case with no chance of 
PTC and thus postpone repowering. On the other hand, when the PTC is currently in effect, 
the producer will expedite repowering if the expiration possibility increases.  
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We then presented a generalized model where the PTC uncertainty is formulated as a 
Poisson process switching between two regimes. We solved the model numerically and found 
that the generalized solution can be approximated by combining the corresponding solutions 
of the two special models. We also showed that the uncertainties in the PTC’s renewal and 
expiration have significant impacts on the optimal repowering thresholds. The empirical 
observation of slow repowering progress in the U.S. is consistent with our model analyses. 
Thus a more appropriately designed policy scheme with less uncertainty might be necessary to 
encourage timely repowering.   
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CHAPTER 5 . EMPIRCAL STUDY OF THE WIND INDUSTRY 
 
This empirical chapter is divided into two parts to address the validity and necessity of 
the two most significant modeling assumptions used in this dissertation.  
We first use empirical evidence from German wind industry to address the validity of 
the assumption that the O&M cost follows a GBM process. We then examine the PTC 
renewal/expiration history to justify our use of Poisson processes. 
5.1 On The GBM Assumption of O&M Cost 
In this section we test the average repair & maintenance cost (euro/kW per year) of 
wind turbines under the Scientific Measurement and Evaluation Program (WMEP) within 
Germany’s “250 MW Wind” project (Fraunhofer IWES, 2006).  
The cost data we use is in courtesy of Fraunhofer Institute for Wind Energy and Energy 
System (IWES) and was depicted for three rated capacity classes: turbines with less than 
500kW (A), with 500kW to 999kW (B) and turbines with more than 1000 kW (C). For each 
class, the average R&M cost was computed for all turbines that were installed in the same year 
and thus the data reflects the general trend of O&M cost development with respect to operating 
life.  
Three statistical tests are conducted in order to check whether the data sets satisfy the 
two necessary properties of a GBM process: 1) normality of log-ratios with constant mean and 
variance; 2) log-ratios independent from previous data (Marathe and Ryan, 2005). 
For normality we first use normal Q-Q plot to graphically depict the out data values 
against associated quantiles of the normal distribution. We then conduct Shapiro-Wilk W test 
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to statistically measure whether the p-value falls into the region where the null hypothesis of 
normal distribution can be rejected. For independency we use the autocorrelation function plot 
to compare the autocorrelation versus lags.   
 
Figure 5.1 Normal Q-Q plot and ACF plot for class A 
 
Figure 5.2 Normal Q-Q plot and ACF plot for class B 
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Figure 5.3 Normal Q-Q plot and ACF plot for class C 
 
Figure 5.1 through Figure 5.3 above show that for each class, the data points in the Q-
Q plot aligns close with a straight line, indicating that the log-ratios are very likely to be 
normally distributed.  
The Shapiro-Wilk W test gives p-values as 0.05364 (class A), 0.9776 (class B) and 
0.9201(class C). All p-values are greater than the significance level of 0.05 and it indicates that 
the null hypothesis of normal distribution cannot be rejected. 
According to the ACF plots in Figure 5.1-5.3 we can also conclude that there exits very 
weak dependence in the cost log-ratios since the autocorrelation falls far within the 95% 
confidence interval lines. 
Based on the results of the three statistical tests we conducted on Germany’s O&M cost 
data, it is appropriate and justified to assume that the annual O&M cost follows a GBM process. 
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5.2 On The Poisson Arrival Assumption of the PTC 
The other important modeling assumption that distinguishes this paper to the other 
policy studies is the Poisson behavior of the PTC’s renewals and expirations. To validate this 
assumption, we summarize the history of PTC since its first debut in 1992 and conduct 
goodness of fit test to the inter-arrival times of policy renewal and expiration.  
As stated before, assuming a series of event arrivals follows a Poisson process, the 
expected time (i.e., inter-arrival time) between two events should be exponentially distributed. 
Following this we first compute the mean value and the estimated lambda of the distribution. 
We then divided the observations into equal-length bins and use Chi-Square test to compare 
the actual probability of each bin and the theoretical probability drawn from the distribution 
(see Table 5.1, time unit in year).  
Table 5.1 Bins and frequencies for Chi-Square test 
 
 
The result shows that for renewal lambda is approximately 6.3654 and p-value is 
0.9476; for expiration lambda is close to 0.5059 and p-value is 0.9113. Both p-values are 
greater than the significance level of 0.05 and thus we conclude that the assumption of the 
arrivals of PTC renewal and expiration following Poisson processes cannot be rejected. 
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CHAPTER 6 . CONLCUSION 
 
Like any other major social economic issues involving environment and climate change, 
the promotion of renewable energy and corresponding government subsidies are almost 
constantly under scrutiny and various opinions exist (includes opposing ones) regarding 
whether subsidies should be continued or not. Motivated by the current existing controversies 
and ‘seems-to-be’ ever going debates, this dissertation attempted to provide a new point of 
view to address one of the practical issue in this area – the investment decision making from 
the perspective of independent producers under cost and policy uncertainties.  
Given that independent power producers still dominate the renewable power 
production and that majority of their output are sold through long-term power purchase 
agreements, I focused on two types of uncertainties that could represent most of their kinds: 
the O&M cost and the PTC. Three types of investment activities that covers the major part of 
any renewable power plant’s economic life are thoroughly investigated in a chronological 
order: a new investor’s initial entry, exit when the plant reaches its economic life, and 
repowering.  
In the first part, we modeled and analyzed how an economically rational decision maker 
will exit and enter a renewable power plant when the O&M cost is represented by a GBM 
process where the renewable power plant is without any input fuel cost. For such a power plant, 
we obtained the threshold level of the O&M cost above which a currently operating renewable 
power plant will exit. We also obtained the threshold level of the O&M cost below which a 
new renewable power plant will enter. The analytical results of this part provided some 
significant policy implications. For example, to implement some sort of exit fee by the 
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government will leads to two diverse results: it will not only help in preventing premature exit 
relative to the physical life, but also prevent O&M cost-wise marginal firms from entering the 
market, which might be less favorable since it reduces the total production amount of electric 
power from the renewable energy. 
In the second part, we moved our attention to the end of a single plant’s economic life, 
and analyzed the effect of cost uncertainty on the producer’s repowering decision making. 
Based on producers’ different sizes, generation resources, and market powers, we classify our 
study subject of such producers into Types I, II, and III. For a single producer of each type, we 
obtained the threshold levels of the O&M cost for the current plant’s repowering/exit decisions 
as well as the repowered plant’s exit decision. Sensitivity analysis as well as numerical study 
were also done to support our significant implications. One significant implication of this part 
is the necessity and importance of regulatory policies on repowering. 
In the third part, we took policy uncertainty into consideration in addition to the 
repowering model presented in the second part. We first constructed two special models in 
which the producer perceives the PTC changing from being not in effect to in effect and from 
being in effect to not in effect. We solved each model analytically and obtained a corresponding 
two-threshold optimal repowering policy.  
We then presented a generalized model where the PTC uncertainty is formulated as a 
Poisson process switching between two regimes. This model has no closed form analytical 
solution and can only be solved numerically. We used a numerical study to illustrate how the 
algorithm works and the result firmly supports the argument that the uncertain policy 
expectation for repowering project might have played a significant role in the slow progress of 
repowering in the U.S. 
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Finally we used the empirical O&M cost data of German wind industry and PTC 
historical data to validate our assumptions regarding the stochastic O&M cost and policy 
renewal (and expiration). This quantitative study greatly strengthened out analytical results. 
Although each problem has been solved separately in each chapter with appropriate 
assumptions, they are not stand alone. From a sustainable point of view, any decision regarding 
investment in the renewable industry has to be carefully calibrated because of the dynamic 
nature of the industry. A decision that is made for now will not only determine the producer’s 
short-term profitability, but also impact his future options in the long run.  
This dissertation, to my personal knowledge, is the first attempt in the renewable power 
investment area to systematically address the consequential decision making problem 
considering uncertainties from both internal and external sources.  However, we do recognize   
its limitations and are planning to explore them as for future study.  First, a more detailed 
setting of having other economic variables involved, such as other cost components, is very 
desirable.  Second, computational algorithms also need to be developed so that a larger scale 
of such problem can be solved more efficiently. More updated empirical data of O&M cost 
from recent installed plants are also desirable. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1 Proofs in Chapter 2  
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1 
The structure of (2.4)’s solution contains the general solution of the homogeneous part 
of it as well as a particular solution to the full equation, which is in the form of 
( )1 21 2( ) CV C AC A C CK PKβ β ρ α ρ= + − − +  
where
 
1β  and 2β  are the roots of the characteristic quadratic equation as 
( )2 2 21 2 1 2 0C C Cσ β α σ β ρ+ − − =
                                                                                         
Solving the quadratic equation we have
( )22 2 2 21 1 2 1 2 2 1C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − + > 
 
 
( )22 2 2 22 1 2 1 2 2 0C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − − − + < 
 
 
We also notice that when 0C → , i.e., the O&M cost becomes negligible, the 
renewable site will not be abandoned, which indicates that the value of the option to abandon 
approaches zero, therefore 2 0A = . After eliminating this speculative bubble, the general 
solution then becomes 
( )11( ) CV C AC CK PKβ ρ α ρ= − − +  
Solving the above solution with boundary conditions (2.5) and (2.6) leads to (2.9) and 
(2.10). 
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A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2 
To prove * 0CC σ∂ ∂ > , we transform it into an equivalent problem of proving 
( ) ( )* * 1 1 0C CC Cσ β β σ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ >
 
by the chain rule. 
For simplicity we denote ( )22 21 2 2C C Cα σ σ ρ− +  as ∆ , and  
( )3 22 2 21
4 2 2
2
4 2 2
2
2 4 12
22
2 4 2 2
2
2 4 4 4
2
C C C C
C C C C C C
C
C C C C
C C
C C C C C
C
β σ α σ ρσ
σ σ σ α σ σ
σ
σ α σ ρσ
α σ
σ α σ ρσ α
σ
  ∂ − +  
= + − − + ∆    ∂ ∆    
 − +
= + − ∆ ∆ 
− + + ∆ − ∆
=
∆
       
       
 
Since the denominator is positive, we only need to check the sign of the numerator to 
determine the sign of the whole equation. For the numerator, if 
4 2 24 2 4 4C C C C Cα σ α σ ρσ∆ > − + − + ∆ , it is positive. Thus we square both sides of the 
inequality and derive the difference between them as 
( ) ( ) ( )2 24 2 2 44 2 4 4 4 0C C C C C C Cα σ α σ ρσ ρσ ρ α∆ − − + − + ∆ = − − <  
Therefore we have 1 0Cβ σ∂ ∂ < . For the sign of * 1C β∂ ∂ , ( )( )( )
*
2
1 1
0
1
CPK WC
K
ρ ρ α
β β
+ −∂
= − <
∂
−
. 
The other remaining properties can be proved similarly. 
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3 
First we use (2.10) to reform (2.13) into a function of the entry threshold 0C  as  
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
0
0 01
*
1
( ) C
C
C K
F C C K PK I
C
β
β ρ α ρρ α β −
= − − + −
−
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When 0 0C =  and 
*C , the value of 0( )F C  can be calculated as 
0( 0) 0F C PK Iρ= = − >  
*
0( ) 0F C C W I= = − − <
 
By taking the partial derivative of 0( )F C  with respect to 0C  we also have that 0( )F C  
is monotonically decreasing, i.e., 
( ) ( )1 1*0 0 0( ) 1 0CF C C K C C β ρ α− ∂ ∂ − − <    given *0C C<  
Hence, there exists a unique solution of 0C . 
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4 
For Proposition 2.4 we briefly present the proof for 0 0C W∂ ∂ <  here. 
Recall 0( )F C  in Appendix A.1.3, it can be further (fully) expanded by using (9) and 
get 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 11
1 11
1
0 1
0 01
1
1( ) C
C
C K
F C C K PK I
PK W
β ββ
β ββ
β
ρ α ρ
ρ α β ρ
−
−
−
= − − + −
− +
 
As shown in A.1.3, 0 0( ) 0F C C∂ ∂ ≠  given *0C C< , which indicates that implicit 
function theorem can be applied to (2.13). We then differentiate (2.13) with respect to
 
W  into 
the following form 
( ) ( )1 1 1 01 0 1 1 0 0
C
CA KC A C
W W
β ββ
ρ α
−  ∂∂
+ − = ∂ − ∂ 
 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
0
0
1
1 1 0 C
A CC W
W A C K
β
ββ ρ α−
∂
∂ ∂
= −
∂
− −
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As in (2.10), ( ) ( ) 11 1*1C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
, and after substitution, we have  
( )
( ) ( )
1
1
1
0
0
1
*
0 1C
A CC W
W K C C
β
βρ α −
∂
∂ ∂
= −
∂  
− −     
 
Since *0C C< , the denominator above  as ( ) ( ) 1 1*0 1 0CK C C βρ α − − − <      .  
Also, it could be mathematically proved that the numerator, ( )( ) 11 0 0A W C β∂ ∂ <  
because 1 0A W∂ ∂ < . Therefore, 0 0C W∂ ∂ < .  
The other remaining properties can be proved similarly. 
A.2 Effect of Planning Horizon on Repowering Decisions 
Renewable power generation facilities tend to have a highly variable lifespan 
depending on factors such as construction quality and operation conditions. In life-cycle 
analysis and levelized cost calculation of these renewable energy sources, generation units 
such as wind turbines and solar panels are often assumed to have an economic life of 20 years. 
We also note that, it is difficult to forecast the renewable power industry in 40 or 50 years and 
to predict what options the producer will have by then, due to the uncertainties from technology 
development, market and policy reformation. Based on this, we generate two different rolling-
horizon scenarios as follows: 
Scenario 1 (the baseline): the study horizon contains only one cycle of repowering. In 
other words, within the planning horizon, the current plant will be repowered once, and the 
producer is assumed to be unable or not willing to re-repower its repowered plant.  
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Scenario 2 (the extension): the study horizon contains only two cycles of repowering, 
that is, the current plant will be repowered twice and then terminated permanently.  
We note that the baseline scenario is exactly the one we adopted in Chapter 3. Here we 
compare the results of the two scenarios to examine the effect of different length planning 
horizons on repowering decision making.  
The optimal repowering policy in the baseline has already been revealed in Section 3.2. 
To facilitate the comparison we modified the notations and restate them as  
( )2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( )b b CV C A C C K P Kβ ρ α ρ= − − +  
( )( )
( )
22 2 2 2
2
2 21
Cb
P K W
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
+ −
=
−
                                                                                  
(A.2.1)
                                         
( ) ( ) 22
2
2 1
2 2
b
b
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                            
( )1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( )b b CV C A C C K PKβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                                  
                                   
 
( ) ( )
( )
1
0
1 1 2 2 1 2 1
1
1 11
b r
Cb
PK V C W I
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
 
− + + − 
=
−
                                                         
(A.2.2)
                             
( ) ( ) 11
1
1 1
1 1
b
b
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                   
( )2 2 2 2 2 222 2 2 22 1 2 1 2 2 1C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − + >  
                                         
( )1 1 1 1 1 122 2 2 21 1 2 1 2 2 1C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − + >  
                                          
 
For the extension scenario, the problem can be solved in the same fashion by starting 
backwardly from the final stage, where the second repowered plant is operating and the time to exit 
97 
 
needs to be determined. The value function of the project 3 3( )eV C  as well as the optimal exit 
threshold 3
eC
 
can be derived as follows: 
( )3 33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3( )e e CV C A C C K P Kβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                                                                                               
( ) ( )
( )
33 3 3 3
3
3 31
Ce
P K W
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
+ −
=
−
                                                                                   
(A.2.3) 
( ) ( ) 33
3
3 1
3 3
e
e
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                
where ( )3 3 3 3 3 322 2 2 23 1 2 1 2 2C C C C C Cβ σ α α σ σ ρ σ = − + − +   . 
Then we move back to stage 2 where the first repowered plant is operating and the time 
to re-repower needs to be determined. The value function 2 2( )eV C  and the re-repowering 
threshold 2
eC
 can be obtained as follows:     
( )2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( )e e CV C A C C K P Kβ ρ α ρ= − − +
                                 
( )( )( )
( )
2
0
2 2 3 3 2 3 2
2
2 21
e r
Ce
P K V C W I
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
− + + −
=
−
                                                    
(A.2.4)
                                                                 
( ) ( ) 22
2
2 1
2 2
e
e
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                               
 
Following similar steps we move backwards to stage 1 to obtain the current plant’s 
value function 1 1( )eV C  and repowering threshold 1eC  as follows: 
( )1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( )e e CV C A C C K P Kβ ρ α ρ= − − +
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( ) ( )
( )
1
0
1 1 2 2 1 2 1
1
1 11
e r
Ce
PK V C W I
C
K
ρ ρ α β
β
 
− + + − 
=
−
                                                    
(A.2.5)
                                                                   
( ) ( ) 11
1
1 1
1 1
e
e
C
KA
C
βρ α β −
=
−
                                                
 
To facilitate the comparison, we first assume as time goes by, the contracted selling 
price for future plants will increase, and the production size will also increase due to better 
design and technology, that is, 1 2 3P P P< < , 1 2 3K K K< < . We also assume that for each plant, 
the O&M cost will follow exactly the same evolution, that is, 0 0 01 2 3C C C= = , 1 2 3C C Cα α α= = , 
1 2 3C C C
σ σ σ= = , and hence 1 2 3β β β= = . 
Moreover, we further assume all repowering projects, no matter when they get built, 
are profitable to the producer for planning purposes, that is, ( )03 3 2 3 0e rV C W I− − > , 
( )02 2 1 2 0b rV C W I− − >  and ( )02 2 1 2 0e rV C W I− − > , which can be justified in the sense that 
repowering would not have become an option if it had a negative return. 
1) Comparison on the First-repowered Plant  
We first compare the repowering/exit thresholds of the first-repowered plant /2
b eC
 
in 
both scenarios. Recalling (A.2.1) and (A.2.4) we have 2 2b eC C>  holds if and only if 
( )02 3 3 2 3e rW V C W I> − + + . Because ( )03 3 2 3e rV C W I− −  is presumed to be positive, 
( )03 3 2 3 20e rV C W I W− + + < < . Therefore the necessary and sufficient condition for 2 2b eC C>  
always holds, which proves that for the first-repowered plant, the repowering threshold of the 
baseline scenario is greater than the exit threshold of the extension. This can be intuitively 
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interpreted as the producer tends to be more tolerant to the loss from the operating asset when 
the available option has a lower expected return.  
We also consider the expected economic life of the plant in both scenarios, which can 
be derived by using Ito’s lemma and expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )2 20 22 2 2ln ln 1 2b b C CT C C α σ= − −
      
(in the baseline) 
( ) ( )2 20 22 2 2ln ln 1 2e e C CT C C α σ= − −
      
(in the extension)
                                                                             
From what we derived before it is easy to see that 2 2
b eT T> , the first-repowered plant is 
expected to have a longer economic life in the baseline scenario. Hereby we make a 
mathematical analogy that in our problem, a longer planning horizon with more cycles of 
repowering will result in a longer expected economic life for a single repowered plant. 
2) Comparison on the Current Plant 
In this sub-section, we compare the repowering thresholds of the current plant /1
b eC
 
in 
both scenarios. Recalling (A.2.2) and (A.2.5) we have 1 1b eC C>  holds if and only if 
( ) ( )0 02 2 2 2b eV C V C< . We also have that given the same 02C , 2 2b eC C>  is the necessary and 
sufficient condition of ( ) ( )0 02 2 2 2b eV C V C< . From the results we derived in 1), 2 2b eC C>  always 
hold under our assumptions, therefore 1 1
b eC C> . This implies that the current plant’s 
repowering threshold increases when the producer selects a longer planning horizon with 
multiple repowering cycles. 
Analogous to 1), we also express the expected remaining life of the current plant in the 
term of /1
b eC  defining 1
cC  as the current observed O&M cost of the current plant: 
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( ) ( )1 121 1 1ln ln 1 2b b c C CT C C α σ= − −
      
(in the baseline) 
( ) ( )1 121 1 1ln ln 1 2e e c C CT C C α σ= − −
      
(in the extension)
    
   
It is easy to see that 1 1
b eT T> , the current plant is expected to have a longer remaining 
life in the baseline scenario. A similar mathematical analogy can be observed for the current 
plant that as the current plant will have a longer remaining life when the planning horizon 
consists of more cycles of repowering. 
Through our comparison, we observed that, a longer planning horizon with more cycles 
of repowering leads to a longer expected economic life for each plant (no matter it is the 
currently operating one or a projected-to-be-repowered one). This implies that a long planning 
horizon might delays the repowering decision making for the current plant, which is 
unfavorable to the current renewable power generation market where a huge amount of 
obsolete generation units need to be repowered. 
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